Private Equity's Access To Better Debt

The other day we pointed to a primer on private equity that ran in the New York Sun. Almost in passing, that article noted that a private equity firm had recently "concluded a deal in which there were no covenants." This is something that deserves more attention than it gets, in part because easier access to debt is one of the things that is helping drive the boom in private equity.

Debt covenants are promises companies make to lenders when they borrow money in the form of bonds or bank debt. Often these covenants restrict the amount of additional debt a company can borrow, require the company to meet certain financial revenues and may restrict the kinds of business a company can engage in, what kind of capital expenditures it can make and prohibit dividends until the debt is paid off. Particularly for troubled companies, these covenants are often merely common sense and may even help a company by giving it some corporate discipline.

But they can also be a burden on a company, particularly in a dynamic or growing industry. The amendment process to change the covenants can be difficult, requiring the agreement of many lenders. Substituting new debt is often an expensive process, giving rise to prepayment premiums and fees from lawyers and investment banks.

Getting lighter covenants is a goal of most companies seeking debt. And here is where private equity has an advantage. A single company may only need to come to investment banks seeking debt once every five years or so. This is a very long time on Wall Street. It means that bankers with relationships with these companies aren't going to be collecting fees from them very often, which gives the companies less leverage when negotiating covenants.

Private equity firms change the dynamic. They may have multiple portfolio companies seeking new debt each year. Which means they are throwing a lot of fees at the bankers involved. This gives them greater leverage in the conference room. Everyone wants the business of the private equity shops, which means they get concessions a single company wouldn't be able to get. When KKR or Tommy Lee are on the other side of the table, they basically get what they want. You can bet that the borrower who got a covenant free loan was sponsored by one of these guys (assuming it wasn't an investment grade company).

In short, private equity shops can get good deals for their companies because they do so many deals.

Comments

1

Posted by Bubble Watch , Dec 07, 2006 11:04AM

This will end in tears.

2

Posted by , Dec 07, 2006 12:02PM

A sponsor deal with no covenants...completley bullshit

3

Posted by John Carney , Dec 07, 2006 12:11PM

It's hard to tell what that means. I'm sure there were requirements to deliver financials. But you can get a lot of the work done in an events of default section while keeping the covenants very light.

4

Posted by Günter Leitold , Apr 04, 2007 8:08AM

LBO puzzle


Three large private equity groups are reported to be in the
advanced stage of a buyout to snap up a company in a deal worth
$ 100 bln.

A person close to the situation reported that they have funded
the equity contribution in the amount of $ 30 bln by equal split
of $ 10 bln. After the transfer has been made the advisor of the
selling shareholders informed the buyout consortium that the
shareholders are supposed to give a discount in the amount of
$ 5 bln related to accounting restatements and reduced operating
cash flows by $ 630 million for the last fiscal year.
Given that the SPV was set up by a complicated and irrevocable
combination of shareholder- and shareholder-loan-certificates
with a face value and minimum transferable increment of $ 1 bln
each the equity sponsors were wondering how to split the $ 5 bln
between the 3 funds. They decided to redeem three certificates
and give back $ 1 bln to each fund and to pocket the remaining
$ 2 bln as a one time management fee and carry-advance for the
three management companies. Now instead of each fund paying
$ 10 bln each got back $ 1 bln and paid $ 9 bln for the deal
instead. $ 9 bln x 3 = $ 27 bln plus the $ 2 bln in fees
for the management companies = $ 29 bln. So where is the missing
$ 1 bln and will the funds be able to mark up the equity by
this amount? ;-)

(for the answer pls look at http://www.highyieldblog.com)

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