How The Government Kept Countrywide Afloat

There’s little in Countrywide’s earnings announcement that seem likely to shake Bank of America from its desire to own the home lending giant. Indeed, shares of Countrywide moved up this morning and the merger arb gap narrowed to 80% or so, implying that traders are getting more confident the deal will eventually close.

This morning the Wall Street Journal carried an interesting article that claims to explain why Countrywide agreed to sell out to Bank of America. Pressure from ratings agencies and regulators threatened to end the way Countrywide did business, the article claims, and this drove the mortgageer into the arms of Bank of America.

But to really understand the article you have to read it backwards, like a teenager spinning a record backwards to hear the hidden demonic exhortation. The real story here is how the government has been funding Countrywide by lending it money through the Federal Home Loan Banks system and guaranteeing deposits in its CDs through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Countrywide CDs had enormous interest rates, and those government guarantees allowed depositors to derive risk free yields of more than 5% in recent months. As those deposits grew, so did its ability to borrow through the FHLB, which allows borrowing on up to 50% of a home loan banks deposit assets.

In short, these government programs allowed Countrywide to escape the discipline of the marketplace for several months. And it was only recent attention from lawmakers and regulator that cast doubt on the willingness of the government to continue these subsidies.

Countrywide Deal Driven by Crackdown Fear [Wall Street Journal]

Comments

Posted by jag, Jan 29, 2008 1:03PM

Whoa, whoa, whoa, hang on just one second. Are you implying that the government has so-called federal agencies that insure bank deposits and lend money to banks?

My mind is fucking blown. WHY IS NO ONE ELSE REPORTING ON THIS? Thank you, John Carney, for your insightful reporting.

Posted by Ken Land, Jan 29, 2008 1:07PM

Don't forget a much bigger subsidy that is yet to come when the government set a higher loan limit for Freddie and Fannie. If that loan limit is reset to $700K as planned, overnight a third of Countrywide's troubled loan portfolio will disappeared from their balance sheet, shifting all future losses to tax payers, and freeing up more capital for them to concentrate on making new loans and expand the extremely profitable loan servicing business. BofA would be stupid not to do the deal. In a sense, this is a government enrichment program for BofA. Where is the outrage?

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 1:13PM

Ken interested to hear how you feel the GSE cap change would cost taxpayers money?

Also curious to know, who exactly is going to fund these loans to the worst borrowers exactly? The only ones that will be able to refinance at all are the better credit quality borrowers.

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 1:23PM

the gse "subsidy" is a straw man bandied about in congress by gse opponents who feel that failing to tax something is akin to a subsidy. you will notice that there is no "gse" expense accounted by the CBO other than a small budget for the OFHEO. it's a little like saying the government subsidizes air by allowing you to breath it without an explicit tarif, imho.

Posted by Yo!, Jan 29, 2008 1:24PM

Interesting, Ken. Would the higher conforming mortgage cap shift existing mortgages to Fan/Fred, or just newly originated (going forward) mortgages? Presumably, Fan/Fred would have some say as to which they're willing to take on too, but that's not really my area.

Posted by Yo!, Jan 29, 2008 1:34PM

Interesting, Ken. Would the higher conforming mortgage cap shift existing mortgages to Fan/Fred, or just newly originated (going forward) mortgages? Presumably, Fan/Fred would have some say as to which they're willing to take on too, but that's not really my area.
I disagree with the subsidy comments above. The government effectively insures Fan/Fred, allowing them to take greater risk. Sure, they might not be paying out an explicit subsidy now, but they are providing the backstop. A real insurer would collect premiums for the insurance provided; the government doesn't even set aside a reserve. If things get really ugly, you'll see some real (tax) dollars subsidizing the GSEs.

Posted by s75, Jan 29, 2008 1:45PM

FNM/FRE would presumably able to buy existing jumbo mortgages into the portfolio, but what is more likely the agencies would prefer to securitize new loans through the guaranty business. But either way to the extent existing jumbos would be in the money to refi there could be a clear shift of risk to GSE portfolios

fwiw I agree with the subsidy comment, it is all highly theoretical, if you want to object on principle then go right ahead but the bottom line is the bottom line here and to my knowledge the Federales are still making money in taxes on corporate profits as well as income derived from GSE-backed paper

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 1:46PM

Fannie Mae (for example) is a Federally Chartered, privately owned company with a stated mission of providing liquidity to the housing market. It's my understanding that the only perks they get are in the form of exemption from State and Local taxes and SEC securities registration requirements.

The government only backs Fannie and Freddie in as much as they may be "too big to fail" - which really could apply to any number of companies these days. In other words, the securities issued (and credit enhanced by Fannie / Freddie) are explicitly NOT backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government.

@ 1:24 Yes, presumably Fannie and Freddie would have some say as to which securities they may purchase from Countrywide should the loan limits be increased.

The change to the loan limits will presumably help people re-structure out of their crappy rate-reset loans as long as they're not currently in default. A bailout, yes, but still won't help many of the people who got a lot of the NINJA loans over the last 5 years - such as the ice-cream truck driver who's sitting on a half million dollar mortgage.

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 2:02PM

Ninjas should be able to take care of themselves.

Posted by Holla Bitch, Jan 29, 2008 2:32PM

What's a record? And why would you spin it backward???

Posted by conebone69, Jan 29, 2008 2:38PM

The record doesn't have a name (hint it's a led zeppelin album) and the track is a little known song called stairway to heaven.

Posted by 1-2, Jan 29, 2008 2:49PM

Weren't/aren't these two companies under accounting investigations because they hid/stole/whatever millions of dollars worth of loans? I can't remember the story (don't cover the space), but i know there were big problems at both the GSEs not too long ago. Only in gov't do we reward companies that commit fraud with lower regulatory requirements.

Also, I don't agree that the subsidy is theoretical. If the GSEs fail then the taxpayer is EXPLICITLY on the hook for any losses. There wouldn't be any discussion about "should we" save them, they're guaranteed to be saved; moral hazards, perverted market, taxpayer losses, yada yada. Obviously, since these are conforming mortgages the likiehood of default is higher, but the fact I back them personally makes a big difference...to me.

If i got my facts wrong let me know.

btw, I'm still waiting for my Pirate loan to reset. I am only paying 20bps p.a.

Pirates: 1
NINJAS: 0

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 3:14PM

I hate to drag these out but here goes anyway ... Lochkeed, Chrysler, Continental Illinois, S&Ls ... I disagree that the moral hazard to GSEs is any different than the others, this will ultimately come down to a difference of opinion but the subsidy at worst is a moral suasion issue, yes if you assume they WILL fail it costs the taxpayer $ but so is the case if you assume Bank of New York fails, or Wal-mart fails, or any other too big to fail entity

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 3:17PM

eh, in effect you would have to argue too that the budget should book a loss against the discounted value of all wars potentially to be fought in the future basically the same as saying that the future potential for a large company to fail is costing taxpayers money. so far, no government agency has failed has it? so far, only private industry has cost the taxpayer.

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 3:48PM

http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts061506cc.htm

Link to SEC website outlining Fannie Mae's "accounting irregularities".

TLDR: they reduced their perceived earnings volatility through inappropriate (non-GAAP FAS 91 and 133) accounting measures.

A bit different from the LOLNODOCUMENTATION Countrywide has been convicted of in Maryland (?).

@ 1-2: I fail to see how the "taxpayer" is directly at risk should something funny happen to Fannie or Freddie. The way the system currently works is Fannie / Freddie credit-enhance bonds which are then sold to various third parties (Bear, etc). The risk lies in the GSE's ability to retain high credit worthiness. Hello Ambac / MBIA. It's my understanding that was why the accounting issues were a "big deal" - people wanted to know wtf they were looking at.

The shadow of the "Too big to Fail" implied guaranty lurks because if the GSE's *were* to go ass over tea kettle, you can say bye bye to your secondary market for mortgages.

As the last few months have indicated, losing secondary markets is a Very Bad Thing.

Posted by 1-2, Jan 29, 2008 3:53PM

@3:14 The difference is in how the TBTF organizations are rescued. If Wal-Mart fails there is debatable action; if a GSE fails there is not. TBTF is an idea; GSEs are contractual obligations.

@3:17 I'm not saying the gov't should "book" any value--they don't "book" anything, especially loss reserves. To do so would be foolish. However, that doesn't mean there risk is not present and should be moderated, especially in light of their recent accounting issues (which neither of you commented on). Also, your assertion that no gov't agency has failed is a frail assertion at best. First, the fact that you back it with an undesirable (judging from your tone) government action such as war puts your logic on faulty footing by itself. Secondly, to assert that only private industry has cost the taxpayer is sheer absurdity. I will obviously concede that no GSEs have failed yet, they havent, but that does not mean they should be expanded.

In other news, I must make a mea culpa. I was under the impression that the loans were explicitly guaranteed, but apparently they aren't. This obviously weakens my argument, but surely the fact I admit mistakes lends credibility to future ditribes.

big words today...

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 3:59PM

the loans are explicitly *not* guaranteed, correct. every piece of gse paper is sure to state there is no govvie guaranty on it.

yes on the one hand these companies benefit from an informal relationship with the government, on the other hand they play an explicit public policy role and in times of distress, capitol hill tells them what to do

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 4:07PM

No worries - I don't even work in high finance - I'm just a mucky muck mouth-breather who dealt with the GSE's going back to 2000 - so this stuff was Kind Of A Big Deal for us.

The business model, and applications, is pretty socialistic but the whole idea is to stabilize markets and for these guys to step in when the capitalistic guys are licking their wounds (aka. now). Whether any of us agree with the purpose they serve, that's what their charter envisioned.

I'm not a proponent of raising the conforming loan limits, as I feel that is simply taking the same pile of poop and just pushing it around your plate. At the end of the day, someone still has to take a big bite of shit.

The hype about raising the limit feels to me like just another SIV dolled up with some lipstick and a miniskirt, and that we're just delaying the inevitable.

In any case, poop sammich inc.

Posted by 1-2, Jan 29, 2008 4:33PM

Not that everything always makes sense, but if the GSEs are NOT gov't backed, then why the interest differentials? Interest compensates (or is supposed to) for risk-taking. Theoretically the only difference between two FI-type securities is the default risk. Higher default risk means the purchaser must be compensated more highly for owning a potentially non-performing asset. If i believe the probability of default for Co. "X" is greater than Co. "Y" then X has to pay me more than i feel the diffault differential is, otherwise i would simply buy Y (EMH). If there is no "insurance" against default on GSE securities (and thus their balance sheet) then why would i lend them money at a lower rate? Which leads to the next question, if they aren't backed by gov't insurance then why does the government need to create a GSE in the first place?

That was a serious question. If anyone has insight I am very curious.

A few points remain unanswered though:
1) GSEs control "trillions of dollars" (wikipedia), is it a good idea to have all that money centered in one institution, especially one under investigation for fraud?
2) GSEs were one of, if not the main creator of securitized mortgages. If the complaints are about how transparent the products are, then people should be looking AT the gse, not at those who purchased their securities and lost money.
3) The GSEs are a major force of market distortions as they can and are used to selectively give money to one group and from another for political not capital-flow reasons.
4) Have the GSEs actually stabilized anything, or are they purely a hot miniskirt?

Serious questions

Posted by series7.5, Jan 29, 2008 4:46PM

In my opinion, and as with all things GSE related this is debatable, the GSEs benefit derives from a few factors 1. direct benefits of special legal status i.e. savings on exemption from SEC registration and state and local taxes 2. the implicit guarantee that same legal status indicates. in each case the savings go to lowering the cost of borrowing for homeowners.

so you are able to have an mbs market, for example, where investors feel the backing on credit losses are reasonably assured by the govt (even though this is explicitly disclaimed on the paper) and so willing to bid these securities higher than "non-agency" paper, so you end up with a sharp discrepancy between the jumbo and non-conforming, i.e. the savings is passed on to the borrower.

Posted by s75, Jan 29, 2008 4:50PM

I would add yes, quite clearly the agency conforming market has been an island in a troubled sea, the only properly functioning and liquid mortgage credit market in the U.S. since August.

I am reminded of an amusing exchange I had with the head of credit strategy of a prominent investment bank, when I asked him how bad it could have gotten if the agency conforming TBA market fell apart, he looked at me with a blank stare for a few moments, then asked me how bad it would have gotten if treasuries had stopped trading. A bit of hyperbole but the fact is these things are everywhere, and for a period of time they were the only acceptable collateral for credit around the global financial system besides Treasuries

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 4:55PM

another interesting question is would it have even been possible to have a fixed rate mortgage market without GSEs?

most other markets are all adjustable. so the interest rate risk all resides with the homeowner. now clearly most homeowners are not sophisticated enough to manage interest rate risk in any intelligent way. so if you believe in homeownership as a social issue then there is a real social benefit to having private industry extract a rent for providing interest rate certainty to the masses.

Posted by 1-2, Jan 29, 2008 4:57PM

S75...good responses. All of this stuff is debatable, but at least you made rational arguments regarding my posits.

I still don't agree with a lot of the reasoning behind GSEs, especially the BS "I'm USA, I promise to NOT back these pieces of paper..." yield discrepency.

anyways, this thread is dead. thanks for some sanity s75.

Posted by , Jan 29, 2008 5:54PM

@ 1-2 4:33 I'm not 100% sure that I'm addressing the right issue here, what do you mean by interest differentials?

The rate that (Fannie Mae) agency paper is traded at is based off 4 factors typically (standard fixed rate stuff, for the sake of simplicity). Freddie rely's on a little black box, which isn't as formulaic.
1: "risk free" treasury rate
2: guaranty fee - the GSE's "you're using our credit rating" premium
3: servicing fee
4: MBS fee - changes deal by deal, this is the premium the guy buying the individual MBS demands

I believe the premiums you refer to apply to any of 2-4, however the market really only has the most direct impact on 4. Inter-market competitive forces have impact on 2 & 3, ala GSE1 wants to steal business from GSE2, etc.

As Series 7.5 stated, effectively the cost of lending for GSE's is less due to their credit ratings, which reduces #4 in my list, however that's kind of offset by #2.

To address your specific points:
1) I guess I'd want to define "control" - these guys hold some loans on their books - however many times those are typically "do gooder" loans which many times the market won't touch. Affordable deals, loans for properties that otherwise wouldn't get financed / made / etc without GSE involvement. As part of the GSE's charters they need to fund $XXX billions of these do-gooder loans every year, or lose their GSE status / perks / whatever.

GSE's are allowed to retain a congressionally-limited dollar amount of MBS on their balance sheets, however their balance sheets are pretty full these days - and the GSE's consistenly lobby for congress to loosen their belt.

2) In my experience, overly-aggressive conduit lenders (not the GSE's) are more to blame for the securitized loan shit show we've seen where losses are exceeding the standard pricing models used historically. To say GSE's were the main purveyor of securitized loan products may or may not be correct, but to say that GSE's are the main reason they're so f'd up today, is disingenuous in my opinion.

3) I agree - GSE's are political animals at heart. A lot of people on The Street don't like the preferential status the GSE's receive, however no politician has the balls to do anything about it. Catch-22 here.

4) To be honest, I haven't followed up on the re-statements, however the information is out there should you choose to check it out.

In any case, sorry for the thread necro - figured I'd just get that stuff out there.

Posted by tooleveraged, Jan 29, 2008 7:10PM

"For housing GSEs, expected taxpayer losses are calculated as the product of the probability of insolvency, The probability of bailout, and the expected dollar losses in the event of default. The presence of a safety-and-soundness regulatory regime likely selves to reinforce the perception of an implicit guarantee and hence influences each of these components. First, regulation itself is likely to reduce the probability of insolvency; but the implied guarantee affects this probability in two different ways: a positive "moral hazard effect" and a negative "charter value effect" (Frame and White 2004). Regulation is also likely to increase the probability of a bailout, and this likelihood is reflected in the implied guarantee. Finally, since it probably strengthens the implied guarantee, regulation may also influence the dollar value of losses to the extent that it allows the housing GSEs to grow larger and hold relatively less capital than they otherwise would. Regulation would therefore likely reduce the probability of insolvency (although this prediction depends on how sensitive the housing GSEs are to changes in their charter value), increase the probability of a bailout, and increase the size of potential shortfalls. Overall, whether housing GSE regulation results in more or less taxpayer risk is an open empirical question." from Frame and White in the Atlanta FRB's Economic Review

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