Many on Wall Street still assume that the government might step in to rescue Lehman Brothers, perhaps as early as this weekend. But the case for bailing out Lehman is far less compelling than the case for bailing out Bear Stearns and the risks even greater. This could mean that Lehman would be allowed to fail.
One difference between Bear Stearns and Lehman is that the collapse of Bear had not been anticipated by the equities market. Going into the weekend of its collapse, Bear was trading at around $30 a share. The market had not priced in its failure. Creditors, customers and counter-parties could credibly claim they had been caught unaware by the firm's collapse.
With Lehman's stock suffering day after day of double digit declines, the market signals of a potential failure are all too clear. The market has priced in a potential collaps. Regulators can reasonably conclude that market participants had ample warning from the equity markets that Lehman was in trouble.
To put it another way, the moral hazard risk is even greater if the government steps in to bail out Lehman than with Bear. Where the market was arguably blindsided by the Bear Stearns collapse, with Lehman all the market signals are there. Anyone continuing to keep money in accounts on which Lehman can draw or lever against is accepting a large amount of risk. A bailout would further drain the ability of the market to discipline investment firms.
The pricing also makes Lehman a risky equity investment. Bear's $30 share price became $2 in the initial rescue. Work out that ratio for Lehman and investors should expect to receive less than 30 cents a share. Even at the elevated $12 Bear investors eventually received, Lehman investors could expect just over a dollar based on today's market price.
We're not hoping for a collapse here, and our analysis shouldn't be read as encouraging a panic. We simply call them as we see them and market participants can make up their own mind about what this means. From our point of view, this analysis only makes it clearer that Lehman's leadership needs to make some dramatic moves to pull their company back from the brink. Yesterday Lehman said it was exploring all strategic alternatives. Many investors, including Lehman employees, are now saying: "Faster, please."
[Editorial Note: I know we promised to move on but there's just too much to talk about with Lehman right now. We'll try to do a better job this afternoon.]






Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 11:55AM
Mayo downgraded stock
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 11:58AM
Too long, didn't read.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:00PM
TLDR
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:01PM
What about counterparty risk with OTC derivative contracts? Someone has to step into Lehmans shoes on those. Still very large systemic risk unless a suitor can be enticed right?
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:05PM
Bear was a liquidity issue, at least in the short term. Lehman can't raise capital. that's bad news and not the govt's responsibility
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:05PM
What number am i??
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:06PM
John - don't apologize for talking Lehman. We are talking a major firm on the brink of collapse. That is significant news with major implications for other firms (and industries who need financing).
Being on top of what's going on is way more important than thinking you're being repetitive.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:09PM
Can we say, Bank of America Brothers?
There's your liquidity.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:11PM
How about a story on worldwide rice markets?
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:12PM
I had heard Fuld did not want to accept what he considered a too-low price for Neuberger. So he played hardball - and lost.
Had he announced that he had $3 or $4 bil IN HAND, this would not be an issue. Instead, it's all we're gonna do a sale of 55% (not done or even close to done); we're gonna spin off the real estate (ditto); etc. People wanted facts, not possibilities. Idiot.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:13PM
Most derivatives counterparties have collateral from Lehman that will enable them to cover all or most of any losses that they take from closing out positions upon an Lb bkptcy. That is, most non-hedge fund counterparties. Some of the smaller hedge funds still don't get collateral from broker-dealer derivs. affiliates with which they trade...they will now.
As far as assigning Lb's positions, most of their counterparties would have to consent to any such assignment, unless the new entity were a successor to the relevant Lb trading entity.
If this were a surprise, sure there would be a lot of unhappy people. They may still be unhappy, but they cannot say anything that happens will be a 'surprise'.
ISDA would probably come out with a nice protocol to smooth things over...their former GC is now a lawyer at Lb so that might make the transition easier.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:19PM
I agree, keep posting Lehman, its the most important thing right now anyway.
Bear went down in March, anyone who has invested in Lehman over the last 6 months knew the risks. And especially the last month. If Lehman is bailed out then the same thing happens and people don't accurately account for risk. It's the reason we are in this mess in the first place. A bank's assets are its people and reputation, Lehman has been losing both for months. Firms fail, and that has to be possible for capital markets to work.
Posted by diablo , Sep 11, 2008 12:40PM
The feds are saving their ammunition for something "big" like "rescuing" the FDIC.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 12:49PM
DAVID EINHORN JUST BLEW A LOAD IN ERIN CALLAN'S FACE.
Posted by guest , Sep 11, 2008 1:50PM
#3 d-b