JPMorgan had a … quarter, whatever, go read about it. Top and bottom-line beats with revs up and net income down y/o/y. And JPMorgan’s investment bank had a … you’d have to say pretty good quarter, with fees still not where I’d like to see them as a former fee-getting banker but with FICC bouncing back nicely from last quarter.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon has transformed the bank’s chief investment office in the past five years, increasing the size and risk of its speculative bets, according to five former executives with direct knowledge of the changes.
Achilles Macris, hired in 2006 as the CIO’s top executive in London, led an expansion into corporate and mortgage-debt investments with a mandate to generate profits for the New York- based bank, three of the former employees said. Dimon, 56, closely supervised the shift from the CIO’s previous focus on protecting JPMorgan from risks inherent in its banking business, such as interest-rate and currency movements, they said.
Some of Macris’s bets are now so large that JPMorgan probably can’t unwind them without losing money or roiling financial markets, the former executives said, based on knowledge gleaned from people inside the bank and dealers at other firms.
Har har har. Much of my admiration for Jamie Dimon comes from the fact that JPMorgan more or less does what Goldman is always accused of doing, and more or less gets away with it, so it’s nice to have proof that JPMorgan is Just A Giant Hedge Fund Masquerading As A Bank. And the story is juicy; I loved the description of Macris as “always ha[ving] off-the-wall ideas, but in hindsight sort of smart ideas,” which golly I have met people like that and I wouldn’t necessarily trust them with all my cash.
But anyway it all sounds very hedge fundy, and there are some ominous signs: as Bloomberg points out, “One public sign that the chief investment office does more than hedge: Its trading risk is on par with that of JPMorgan’s investment bank.” True, or close enough. Here is JPM IB VaR vs. CIO VaR ($mm 95% daily VaR, reported page 42 here and, for 2010, page 38 here):
But … Jamie’s not exactly getting a ton for his money. Here is dollars of quarterly revenues per dollar of average daily VaR for the investment bank (IB net revs divided by IB total VaR including credit portfolio) and for the chief investment office (VaR is reported; I eyeball revs as securities gains in Treasury & CIO from page 35 here plus net interest income from page 34; that is kind of wholly arbitrary and also CIO appears not to mark to market so “securities gains” is not comparable to to MTM gains, but do you have better ideas?):
Or, if you like, revenues to assets (same caveats on what “revenues” means; assets are IB total assets from page 11 of today’s supplement and treasury & CIO average investment securities portfolio from page 35):
So you could read this as something like: of course JPMorgan gets a lot more revenues out of a largely fee/commission/spread-earning business like IB than it does out of a largely buy-and-hold business like CIO. True. Or you could read it as: shut up, JPM’s not marking CIO to market makes this whole exercise completely silly, maybe the internal hedge fund is making truckloads of money on a mark-to-market basis and would be blowing out the investment bank if they reported comparably. Also true. But if you divide those charts by each other you’ll notice that CIO’s balance sheet – y’know, “managing the long-term structural assets and liabilities of the firm and is not focused on short-term profits” – actually seems to be riskier than the daily-traded inventory of the investment bank (VaR per balance sheet, in basis points):
So, I don’t know. With declining activity, increasing regulation, etc. etc., maybe investment banking isn’t as great a business as it used to be. But I suspect it remains better than giving all your money to some CIO kooks and asking them to buy up all the structured credit that there is in the world.