Every financial contract is subject to a bunch of risks, and in some sense each of those risks affects its value. There’s some chance that an asteroid will crash into the earth next year, rendering your 30-year interest rate swap considerably less valuable, and if you’re so inclined you can discount its value for that possibility.

One nice thing to imagine is that your financial contract is, like, one contract, and all the risks are spelled out in that contract, and you can figure out the value of the contract based on real or market-implied probabilities of all the risks happening etc., and you add them all up and you conclude “the market value of this contract today is 12!” or whatever and you go on your merry way. But that doesn’t need to be true. Some of your risks live in the contract and are part of the contract; some live in the counterparty and have to do with the counterparty’s riskiness; some live in whatever collateral arrangements you have with the counterparty and have to do with the mechanics of your collateral; some are asteroids.1

Anyway, remember the Deutsche Bank whistleblower story? I said last week that the question of whether DB’s actions constituted accounting fraud was not a particularly interesting question, but that is all relative and you’d be surprised what I find interesting. One thing I find interesting: those Deutsche Bank trades! And umm their accounting.

So, some background. As far as I can tell, DB sold a bunch of credit protection in sort of normal ways, CDX and stuff. And it bought a bunch of protection in leveraged super senior tranches. A super senior tranche, classically, is:

  • You have a pool of reference assets,
  • You pay some spread to a protection writer,
  • If defaults wipe out more than some unlikely-seeming percentage – 15%, say – of those assets, then the protection writer gives you money, more or less 1% of notional for every 1% of losses over that threshold,
  • So for instance if there are 40% losses you get paid 25%.
  • The protection writer is like a big bank or monoline or whatever and, in 2005, is either AAA/AA or is posting mark-to-market collateral or both.

So there’s your trade. A leveraged super senior is the same thing, except replace that last bullet point with:

  • The protection writer posts a bunch of collateral – 10% of max exposure, say – day one.
  • The protection writer is a Canadian asset-backed commercial paper conduit or some other non-credit party.2
  • If certain bad things happen that make you worry that you don’t have enough collateral, you can ask the protection writer to post more collateral, but (1) they don’t have to, (2) they don’t want to, and (3) they can’t.3

So the same thing only different. The basic claim here is that Deutsche Bank started out treating its leveraged super seniors as almost like regular super seniors (although with a 15% haircut to roughly account for the fact that they were non-recourse beyond the initial collateral), and ended up treating them as exactly like regular super seniors (with no haircut at all), with the result being that their assets, capital, etc. were all inflated compared to how they’d look if DB had treated these trades properly. This claim, to be fair, comes from whistleblowers some of whom weren’t at DB at the time of the trades, and is of course disputed – Deutsche disagrees, and their valuations seem to have been signed off on by their regulators at BaFin.

Still, if it’s true: that seems bad, no? Here I drew you a picture:

And then I drew you a more worrying picture:

The claim is that DB pretended they’d bought a put (the first picture – if credit gets worse than X, the contract covers their losses), but actually bought a put spread (the second picture – if credit gets worse than X, the contract covers their losses only up to X + 10%).4 Those pictures, intuitively, should have very different values.5

So how bad is that? It strikes me that there are about two ways to think about this.

First, maybe this trade is a super senior tranche – i.e. a put, the first picture – plus some wonkery in the credit support documents that might make it look in practice in some states of the world like a put spread, the second picture. In this theory the trade is a super senior tranche – the protection writer owes DB the full amount of losses, in some abstract sense of the word “owes” – but it might be hard for DB to collect. Here is a DBRS note on leveraged super seniors that says “although they feature leverage, the leverage is located outside the structure, as opposed to being an integral feature of the structure (such as in CDO squared transactions).” That is sort of a weird thing to say! To say it you need to imagine that:

  • There is The Thing – the stuff “inside the structure” – which is a regular super senior tranche, and
  • There is Outside The Thing, such as the non-recourse collateral arrangements, which basically say “oh never mind you don’t actually have to come up with all that money.”

If you believe that then it’s just about imaginable to value The Thing as a super senior tranche and then put on a surprised look when someone asks you “well what about the Outside The Thing that says the counterparty doesn’t actually need to pay?” “I didn’t think about that,” you say, “I was just valuing The Thing.”

This sounds stupid, I know, but it has an analogy in credit valuation adjustments in regular derivatives. If you buy a derivative, you can calculate the value of the cash flows in the contract called the “derivative.” You can also worry about, well, will my counterparty actually pay me if it turns out he owes me a ton of money under the “derivative”? And so there is a whole apparatus around (1) trying to make sure the counterparty will pay you (collateral! credit support annexes!) and (2) figuring out what the odds are that he won’t, and how much that costs (CVA!). The derivative is The Thing; the CVA is Outside The Thing. The CVA is enough of A Thing of its own that there are all sorts of rules about how to account for it, but it’s worth noting that those rules are not just “the CVA is part of the value of a derivative and changes in CVA are in all respects identical to changes in market prices, etc.”

Perhaps of interest for our purposes: the way CVA works, roughly speaking, is that if your derivative receivable is less than your collateral, you have no CVA. If the mark-to-market today is $10bn and you have $11bn of collateral, you can show $10bn of assets with no CVA adjustment, no matter how shady your counterparty is. If the mark-to-market doubles to $20bn and you can’t get more collateral, then the extra $9bn needs to be CVA adjusted: you can’t just pretend that you’ll get all of that $9bn.

You can imagine a similar thought process on the leveraged super seniors: DB’s counterparties were shady, perhaps, but they’d collateralized the full initial exposure and hten some. And some rough math suggests that the collateral actually did more than cover Deutsche Bank’s actual exposure even at the height of the crisis, meaning that Deutsche was never owed more than it could cover out of the collateral.6 On a CVA-ish view of the world, you could almost get comfortable treating these trades as though they were regular super senior trades. (And, cynically, you could imagine traders convincing auditors, used to a CVA-ish view of the world, to get comfortable with that treatment even if the traders thought it was dubious.)

The second way to think about it is, you could say: that’s ridiculous. The trade is intended and designed and built to be a put spread, the second diagram. No one could possibly have thought that if 100% of the reference names defaulted, some ABCP conduits would stump up another $120bn to make Deutsche Bank whole.7 Therefore you couldn’t value the trade the same was as you’d value a super senior tranche, and if you did, especially as credit spreads widened and the world seemed closer to ending, you were clearly up to no good and possibly up to fraud. That’s what Eric Ben-Artzi’s allegations sound like: if Deutsche people were in fact running around making its accounting for these tranches more aggressive as the crisis got worse, that suggests that they were doing something other than having an intellectually honest consideration of how to value features of the tranches and related credit documentation.

Anyway! Let us again leave for another day (1) what happened and (2) whether it was fraud. Let us also leave aside the fact that the realized losses were extremely low, well below the collateral amounts,8 meaning that there was no difference in outcome between the leveraged super senior that DB bought and the regular super senior that it maybe pretended it had. The point is just that one of these views of the world is “right,” from a like theoretical-finance mark-everything-to-market perspective; the other is intellectually displeasing and stupid and messy, but also not all that surprising in comparison with all the legal and operational and regulatory gaps and differences and weirdnesses that actually exist in the world. I don’t know who’s right here, but you could see why the disagreement might get pretty heated.

Earlier: Deutsche Bank Ignored Some “Losses” Until They Went Away

1. And other features of physics, law, the world, etc. Like: your swap doesn’t have an “Asteroids” section, but either it has a “force majeure” or “impossibility” or similar section, or some rules for dealing with such a situation are implied by ISDA documents and/or background principles of contract law, etc. etc. Anyway the result is, your counterparty will stop paying you after the asteroid hits. Also there are other results.

2. The big FT article said they were Canadian pension funds but this seems unlikely; the pension funds were big investors in the conduits’ paper but probably not direct credit counterparties to Deutsche.

3. Let’s unpack those because they’re fun:

  • “Certain bad things”: the trade has a trigger such that if the trigger is hit, the protection buyer (DB) can call for more collateral, and the seller (Canadian conduit) can either post more collateral or unwind the trade at fair value. The bad things can be actual realized losses (a minority of trades), actual mark-to-market on the tranche, or some sort of spread mark-to-market on the index. Here is a very useful primer, via Lisa Pollack.
  • They don’t have to: it’s non-recourse! The contract allows them to just unwind instead of posting more. If the unwind burns through more than their collateral, they’re not on the hook.
  • They don’t want to: this is debatable, I guess, but the theory is that when the trade moves against you you should unwind it (at fair value – you don’t automatically lose your collateral) and enter a new trade at a higher spread, rather than just put more at risk in this trade. So you should never post. This is a very Black-Scholes way of looking at the world – in the actual world where the trigger is hit, (1) an unwind is likely to be expensive and blow through your collateral and (2) you may not get to enter a more-attractive trade elsewhere – but is a useful rough cut.
  • They can’t: they’re Canadian ABCP conduits and so if they wanted to post more collateral they’d have to go out and raise it in the ABCP market. Which, when they needed to post more collateral, was frozen.

4. Possibly worse than that, because of the difference between mark to market and actual payout on defaults. So here you can read about a lawsuit between Barclays and a Canadian conduit called Devonshire. There’s a lot going on here, but for our purposes, Devonshire put up $600mm of collateral on a leveraged super senior, Barclays claimed at trigger was hit and that the mark to market was $1.2bn (so Devonshire would have to put up another $600mm to keep the trade on), and the judge took a look, saw that realized defaults were $12,000 (twelve thousand!) rather than $1.2 billion, and so made Barclays give Devonshire its $600 million back. So Barclays may have thought it had a $600mm put spread but in fact it had mostly a nothing.

5. Depending on your inputs. If the world can never be worse than so-so to great, then the trades don’t really have different values. That, obviously, is the thinking behind putting these trades on in the first place.

6. Rough math goes like:

  • ~7-8 years duration
  • Spread moves in DB’s favor by ~100-125bps
  • = DB’s mark-to-market is 7-10% of notional
  • DB has collateral of 10% of notional

Note that in that Barclays case above the collateral was only ~50% of the mark to market, so this rough math could well be off.

7. This is somewhat academic as no one thought that 100% of the reference names would default.

8. Again I can’t resist that Barclays deal where they had a $1.2 billion mark to market and twelve thousand dollars of actual losses.

17 comments (hidden for your protection)
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Comments (17)

  1. Posted by anonhfm | December 10, 2012 at 11:32 AM

    It's not *quite* a put spread. DB has the right to terminate the trade if the loss threshhold is hit and the counterparty elects not to post more collateral. So from DB's perspective, it is a less risky than a put spread (where DB would be stuck short the low-strike put at time of like very high vol). The pricing of the put spread would, though, represent a boundary for pricing of the leverage super-senior (so if DB were pricing the lev super-senior position equal to the value of a put spread, you'd know they were doing something shady).

  2. Posted by B.OwlingGuru | December 10, 2012 at 11:35 AM

    Over the line!

  3. Posted by gap quant | December 10, 2012 at 11:49 AM

    matt – good summaries so far – but you are missing the one element of these trades that really caused all the problems –

    most people knew about the gap risk and the fact that the conduits couldn't post additional collateral if/when the triggers were hit – so to mitigate this risk, the protection buyers (DB/ML/RBS/CIBC) provided liquidity to the conduits that were suppose to be drawn on in order to fund the collateral short falls (realizing that actual losses would never exceed the attachment points)

    however, these liquidity agreements (usually embedded in the credit support annex) provided that if that the liquidity could only be drawn if there was a "market disruption event" – broadly defined as a freezing of the canadian abcp market. during the crisis, the third party conduit abcp definitely froze but banks (i.e. RBC, TD, CIBC) were still able to roll their ABCP – so DB (and ML) with the biggest positions (and most to loose in terms of funding), took the position that there was NOT a market disruption event and didn't honor their liquidity commitments. of course, the conduits stop rolling paper, couldn't raise funds to post post more collateral and the swap counterparties tried to close out the trades. – it should be noted that only DBRS blessed these liquidity agreements and gave the structure a 'AAA'

    what is somewhat unique about this story is how it was resolved – parties got together and restructured their trades into what are commonly now known as MAV notes – these are administered by Blackrock (see website https://www.blackrock.com/X/CMAV2/public/disclaim… – what i think is uniquely Canadian about the solution is that regular (mom and pop) investors in the ABCP was made whole and only large institutions took losses

    getting back on point, DB is in news because of the 'whistleblower' but i would not be at all surprised in ML, RBS (ex ABN) and HSBC also had the issues….

    e-mail me if you want to chat more….

  4. Posted by gap quant | December 10, 2012 at 11:49 AM

    matt – good summaries so far – but you are missing the one element of these trades that really caused all the problems –

    most people knew about the gap risk and the fact that the conduits couldn't post additional collateral if/when the triggers were hit – so to mitigate this risk, the protection buyers (DB/ML/RBS/CIBC) provided liquidity to the conduits that were suppose to be drawn on in order to fund the collateral short falls (realizing that actual losses would never exceed the attachment points)

    however, these liquidity agreements (usually embedded in the credit support annex) provided that if that the liquidity could only be drawn if there was a "market disruption event" – broadly defined as a freezing of the canadian abcp market. during the crisis, the third party conduit abcp definitely froze but banks (i.e. RBC, TD, CIBC) were still able to roll their ABCP – so DB (and ML) with the biggest positions (and most to loose in terms of funding), took the position that there was NOT a market disruption event and didn't honor their liquidity commitments. of course, the conduits stop rolling paper, couldn't raise funds to post post more collateral and the swap counterparties tried to close out the trades. – it should be noted that only DBRS blessed these liquidity agreements and gave the structure a 'AAA'

    what is somewhat unique about this story is how it was resolved – parties got together and restructured their trades into what are commonly now known as MAV notes – these are administered by Blackrock (see website https://www.blackrock.com/X/CMAV2/public/disclaim… – what i think is uniquely Canadian about the solution is that regular (mom and pop) investors in the ABCP was made whole and only large institutions took losses

    getting back on point, DB is in news because of the 'whistleblower' but i would not be at all surprised in ML, RBS (ex ABN) and HSBC also had the issues….

    e-mail me if you want to chat more….

  5. Posted by gap quant | December 10, 2012 at 11:49 AM

    matt – good summaries so far – but you are missing the one element of these trades that really caused all the problems –

    most people knew about the gap risk and the fact that the conduits couldn't post additional collateral if/when the triggers were hit – so to mitigate this risk, the protection buyers (DB/ML/RBS/CIBC) provided liquidity to the conduits that were suppose to be drawn on in order to fund the collateral short falls (realizing that actual losses would never exceed the attachment points)

    however, these liquidity agreements (usually embedded in the credit support annex) provided that if that the liquidity could only be drawn if there was a "market disruption event" – broadly defined as a freezing of the canadian abcp market. during the crisis, the third party conduit abcp definitely froze but banks (i.e. RBC, TD, CIBC) were still able to roll their ABCP – so DB (and ML) with the biggest positions (and most to loose in terms of funding), took the position that there was NOT a market disruption event and didn't honor their liquidity commitments. of course, the conduits stop rolling paper, couldn't raise funds to post post more collateral and the swap counterparties tried to close out the trades. – it should be noted that only DBRS blessed these liquidity agreements and gave the structure a 'AAA'

    what is somewhat unique about this story is how it was resolved – parties got together and restructured their trades into what are commonly now known as MAV notes – these are administered by Blackrock (see website https://www.blackrock.com/X/CMAV2/public/disclaim… – what i think is uniquely Canadian about the solution is that regular (mom and pop) investors in the ABCP was made whole and only large institutions took losses

    getting back on point, DB is in news because of the 'whistleblower' but i would not be at all surprised in ML, RBS (ex ABN) and HSBC also had the issues….

    e-mail me if you want to chat more….

  6. Posted by Guest | December 10, 2012 at 11:56 AM

    Simple question: why did they even put on the whole massive trade if they expected to end up flat?

  7. Posted by gap quant | December 10, 2012 at 12:04 PM

    upfront fees – conduits paid decent fees to the banks and expected to earn the difference between the cheap cost of funds and the LSS premium received

  8. Posted by HAM05 | December 10, 2012 at 12:06 PM

    sometimes you just need a bump to get your head right, why question it?

  9. Posted by Guest | December 10, 2012 at 12:35 PM

    I'm literally drooling all over myself.

  10. Posted by Guest | December 10, 2012 at 12:58 PM

    Its confirmed. Matt is the best financial writer out there today.

  11. Posted by Guest | December 10, 2012 at 1:05 PM

    Is he bona fide?

    -Wharvey gal

  12. Posted by larry | December 10, 2012 at 1:13 PM

    major turn off from the marketing ads- bye bye

  13. Posted by ih8edjfkjr | December 10, 2012 at 1:41 PM

    "Where Did Deutsche Bank Get The Losses That It Ignored Until They Went Away?"

    A poker-playing, card-counting, whale harpooning, 27 year old MD-becoming, chess life master?

  14. Posted by 2 cubes over | December 10, 2012 at 2:19 PM

    Concurred.

  15. Posted by Guest | December 10, 2012 at 3:09 PM

    Hmm, OK. But why not just hook up both ends of the risk trade directly to each other, take the fees for arranging the deal, tell them "you guys have fun, we're out of here", and not take the position in the middle?

    It just seems like remaining in the middle of the trade leaves nothing but downside risk by way of counterparty exposure.

  16. Posted by gap quant | December 10, 2012 at 5:11 PM

    because there is more money to be made from selling protection in unlevered form (i.e. receiving premiums from selling index/tranche protection) and then hedging by buying protection in leveraged form (via LSS)

    you just have to made sure you get the deltas right and also properly account for the various basis – seems like the whale wasn't the only one to get this a bit off…..

    any funny part of this story is that the conduits posted their upfront collateral (i.e. 10%) usually in the form of ABS CDOs so DB et. al were not only long gap risk but any collateral they would have been delivered were also pretty shitty – not sure if they accounted for this form of 'counterparty/CVA' risk appropriate but that could be another element of the hidden losses

  17. Posted by Ebay coupon codes | November 28, 2013 at 4:58 AM

    Hmm, OK. But why not just hook up both ends of the risk trade directly to each other, take the fees for arranging the deal, tell them "you guys have fun, we're out of here", and not take the position in the middle?