The Treasury’s Entity is seen as a Citigroup bailout by lot of people for the very simple reason that it is a Citigroup bailout. That might not be the only thing it is, but stupid is as stupid does, and one thing this stupid thing does (or will do, if it ever gets off the ground) is bailout Citigroup, which is reportedly on the hook for as much as $80 billion from it’s four mammoth SIVs. Since the fund could buy Citigroup’s SIVs, it would reduce the amount that Citigroup would need to write off. And reducing write-offs is something Citi desperately wants to do right now.
There’s at least a fair amount of quiet clapping about the Treasury Department’s role in creating the Entity. Citigroup, some say, is too big to fail, and the Treasury Department should step in to prevent the kind of financial market disorder that would come from the toppling of the towering financial giant.
But this kind of logic has some rethinking the wisdom of the financial regulatory reforms that allowed banks such as Citi to grow so large in the first place. When lawmakers reformed depression era laws that stood in the way of these financial super-markets, they tended to sound libertarian notes about allowing financial innovation and the operation of the free market to control the size and scope of Wall Street firms. The era of government planning was over. So the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had separated investment houses from commercial banks—most famously requiring JP Morgan to part from Morgan Stanley—was changed to permit the growth of the universal banks.
Many now think that the universal bank is a failed strategy. From Citi to Merrill to Bear Stearns, there are calls for Wall Street firms to slim down, break-up and concentrate on the core businesses that made them wealthy and famous to begin with. But was it a failure? If growing into financial giants allowed them to unilaterally acquire a secret—and nearly costless—government insurance policy, it seems like a great gamble. The executives and shareholders get the upside, while the broader public insures against failure.
“What a scam that is,” writes William Greider in The Nation.
And it’s a scam the Greider thinks is over. Banking regulation will inevitably make a big comeback, he predicts.
“At least the unambiguous truth about ‘financial modernization’ is now on the table for all to see,” he writes. “That should keep the Wall Street guys from whining for a while about the oppressive nature of bank regulation. The next reform era, when it does finally arrive, will head in the opposite direction—restoring public protections for the little guys against the greedy excesses of big hogs.”
What Greider doesn’t mention is that this era of new regulations might be coming too late. Or, rather, right on time, depending on your point of view. Resistance to a new wave of banking regulation requiring bank breakups and dividing Wall Street according to regulatory fiats rather than market demand is likely to be weak in an era when many think the financial supermarket model has failed and should be abandoned. No-one expends much time, money or energy defending a right to do something they don’t want to do anyway. What’s more, there will be plenty of money made by investment bankers spinning-off, selling and acquiring the fragments they are shoring up against the ruins of the toppled giants. Some of these people may actually be the same ones who made fortunes building the giants.
And we’ll all raise a glass to the only saloon in town where it’s never last call: the Wall Street punch bowl.
Citibank: Too Big to Fail? [The Nation]



Merrill has postponed the auction of $400mm in assets it seized from the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund at Bear Stearns, Charlie Gasparino of CNBC is reporting. Merrill and other major lenders to the fund, including Citi and JPMorgan, are in a feel-good asset management “pow-wow” with Bear this afternoon. The fund is expected to make its case that it has a plan to recover from it recent catastrophe in the subprime market.
Eddie Lampert may be betting that former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin is poised to take over as chief of Citigroup, according to a former colleague of both Lampert and Rubin. Earlier this week,
“Were you sacked, or did you quit?”
Maybe there’s a reason Citi is putting its umbrellas away. Citi announced that it will spend $50bn over the next 10 years on “investments, financings and related activities designed to address global climate change.” Citi claims the sum includes $10bn Citi has already invested in such endeavors. Unfortunately the “Let’s get it done” path to profitability closely mirrors the strategy employed by the underpants gnomes in South Park (Step 1- invest in green tech, Step 2 - [conspicuous silence], Step 3 - profit!), unless “addressing global climate change” involves throwing around all that Saudi money in a way that doesn’t directly choke baby seals.
“Firing Jamie Dimon was the worst thing Sandy ever did,” the investment banker said. It was a glorious Friday afternoon. The weather had performed an April summersault, turning over from winter to what felt like summer almost overnight. It was the kind of weather that inspires people—okay, us—to leave work early and starting drinking with friends. Which is how we found ourselves looking out onto a narrow street in the East Village drinking pints and talking about Jamie Dimon, Sandy Weill, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase.
Earlier this week we ran into an old friend who has been trading financial stocks for several years. We were in a small bar a few steps down from street level. The wall paper was a deep red, the furniture included antique looking couches, and faux-gas lamps lit the place dimly. It was the sort of place a Victorian era vampire might feel comfortable sipping absinthe while he hunted his next victim.
Citigroup’s Chuck Prince was apparently disappointed by the market’s reaction to the announcement that Citi was eliminating 15,000 jobs. Now he’s throwing another 11,000 jobs onto the funeral pyre, according to published reports.
So now we know how much it costs to buy off the chief executive of American Express—$10 million. That’s the compensation package for incoming Citigroup chief financial officer Gary Crittenden disclosed today in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. That’s about twice what he was making as chief financial officer of American Express.
Yesterday Maria Bartiromo, uhm, scored with a top Citigroup executive.
Is all not well in the house of CNBC? We’ve mentioned again and again the love that CNBC executives, and their bosses at GE, have for Maria Bartiromo. But is their love unrequited? San Antonio Express-News business columnist David Hendricks writes that Maria didn’t even so much as mention the network at a recent speech in San Antonio.
The rather under-whelming reaction in much of the media to the revelations about top dog CNBC reporter and “Closing Bell” anchor Maria Bartiromo’s relationship with former Citigroup honcho Todd Thompson—today, for instance, the New York Post’s Keith Kelly reveals that both Business Week and Reader’s Digest are keeping Bartiromo on board as a columnist—brings to mind one of the first lessons we ever learned in journalism ethics. 


