bank capital

  • 09 Jul 2013 at 1:49 PM
  • Banks

New Capital Regulations No Big Deal, Say Regulators

US banking regulators have released new proposals to require banks to have higher leverage ratios, counterintuitively meaning lower leverage, and you can go read them here, or read about them here or here. Briefly: in addition to regular Basel III risk-based capital requirements, banks are also subject to a backstop equity-divided-by-assets0 leverage test, and internationally the minimum is 3%, but in the US it’ll be 5% for the biggest bank holding companies and 6% for the biggest insured banks. The OCC estimates that the banks are in total about $84 billion or so short of that requirement, though they have five years to get there, so it’s not, like, go sell $84 billion of stock right now or whatever.1

We have talked about leverage ratios to death and now they are dead. Leverage ratios, yaaaay.

But here is a weird thing from the regulators’ joint notice of proposed rulemaking: their estimate that banks’ cost of equity capital is just 0.56% above their cost of debt: Read more »

It’s become fashionable to make fun of the Basel risk-based capital rules for being overly complicated and subject to gamesmanship. “Why should we risk-weight assets at all?” people ask, for some reason. “Just look at simple leverage and assume that all assets are equally risky!” Sure okay. The problems with treating all risks the same seem too self-evident to be worth discussing (though we have!) but on the other hand I challenge you to read Friday’s Basel Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme report on the “Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book” without feeling a bit of sympathy for the simple-leverage crowd.

Not because the report is complicated, particularly? It’s actually pretty straightforward in concept. Basel II and III allow big banks to use the internal ratings-based approach to credit risk, in which the risk-weighting of a bank’s loans,1 and thus the bank’s capital requirements, are determined by the bank applying its own internal models to determine the credit risk of its borrowers. So to calibrate that system, the Baselisks went out and asked a bunch of banks to give them the probability of default that they assigned to a bunch of sovereign, financial, and corporate borrowers. Lo and behold some banks assigned different probabilities of default to some borrowers than others did and so you get somewhat head-scratching charts like this one: Read more »

If you think bank regulation should be made much simpler it’s probably worth reading today’s Basel Committee document on bank leverage ratios, which the chairman of the Basel Committe described as “a relatively simple measure.” And what could be simpler than regulating leverage ratios?1 It’s just, like:

  • tot up all your assets, including all your creepy off-balance-sheet stuff and evil derivatives and so forth,
  • divide by your equity, and
  • take the reciprocal for some reason.

This is the theory behind proposals like the Brown-Vitter bill, which would do away with risk-based capital measures and focus on simple leverage. No risk-weighting, no monkeying with different kinds of equity, no problem. Just simple, impossible to manipulate, straightforward, easily comparable measures of how levered – and thus how risky – every bank is.

Hahaha no kidding it’s full of weird stuff: Read more »

Some analysts at the Bank for International Settlements have found a new way to unwind too-big-to-fail banks painlessly, which I guess is newsworthy; here is a good summary, and here is the actual paper. The basic idea is to resolve a bank over the weekend by writing down its debt by some regulator-chosen amount X, giving it X more capital, which is held by a new temporary holding company. Then the bank reopens for business on Monday with more equity and less debt. The holding company eventually sells its equity in the bank to the market, and distributes the proceeds “to [the old bank’s] creditors and shareholders strictly according to the hierarchy of their claim.” Here are some blue boxes:

The main attraction of this, besides speed, is that it provides a market mechanism for determining how much senior creditors lose: regulators decide how much of the bank’s senior liabilities are converted into holdco liabilities, but those holdco liabilities retain their seniority over subordinated liabilities and equity, and ultimately the amount of writedowns suffered by the senior (and junior for that matter) debtholders depends on how much the bank’s equity is ultimately worth when the holdco sells it.

It’s neat! There are some issues. One is picking the initial writedown. The authors say: Read more »

  • 20 Feb 2013 at 4:37 PM
  • Banks

Banks Doing Too Much, Too Little Lending

One lazy but fun thing to do as a financial blogger is to find two publications saying the opposite thing on the same day, and then be all “haha, dopes.” Business Loans Flood the Market, the Journal informed us this morning, while Bloomberg tells us that by another measure loans are at a five-year low, though being Bloomberg the way they put it is JPMorgan Leads U.S. Banks Lending Least of Deposits in 5 Years. So is there a flood of loans, or a least of loans? Which is it, guys?

Well, both, obviously; “haha, dopes” would not be fair here. Loans are up, relative to the last couple of years, but loans as a percentage of deposits are at a low – 84% for the top 8 commercial banks, per Bloomberg, as opposed to 101% in 2007. Bloomberg acknowledges this tension:

Falling ratios don’t mean banks have shut the lending spigots. Measured in dollars, total loans rose in the fourth quarter for the biggest eight lenders to $3.9 trillion.

As does the Journal, which notes that “The push comes at a time when many banks have been flooded with deposits as slow economic growth and low interest rates crimp investment.”

The way I think about banks is that they do two somewhat separate things, which are:

  • satisfy some people’s demand for money claims (short-term, safe, exchangeable-for-fixed-amount-of-cash bank liabilities),1 and
  • satisfy other people’s demand for loans.

It’s not entirely obvious why those things would move in lockstep: Read more »

When the London Whale thing came out, JPMorgan made one sort of clever attempt to minimize it by saying this:

Since March 31, 2012, CIO has had significant mark-to-market losses in its synthetic credit portfolio, and this portfolio has proven to be riskier, more volatile and less effective as an economic hedge than the Firm previously believed. The losses in CIO’s synthetic credit portfolio have been partially offset by realized gains from sales, predominantly of credit-related positions, in CIO’s AFS [available-for-sale] securities portfolio. As of March 31, 2012, the value of CIO’s total AFS securities portfolio exceeded its cost by approximately $8 billion. Since then, this portfolio (inclusive of the realized gains in the second quarter to date) has appreciated in value.

What did this mean? Well, I think it roughly meant what it said, which is that as if March 31, JPMorgan’s Chief Investment Office had about $375bn worth of bonds for which it had paid about $367bn, and that after March 31 (1) that portfolio of bonds increased in value to at least $375,000,000,001 and (2) JPMorgan had sold at least some of those bonds at a profit. But one nice thing about it is that, if you squinted, you could read it as “our hedge decreased in value, yes (and by $2bn), but that’s because the underlying portfolio increased in value (by $8bn), so net-net we’re way ahead, and it was a hedge, and whaddarya gonna do, hedges go down when things-hedged go up, that’s life.” That turned out to be an entirely wrong reading but hey they tried!

Reuters moved that story forward a bit with this kind of interesting parsing of Jamie Dimon’s words, including particularly the statement that JPMorgan had realized $1bn of gains on the CIO portfolio of available-for-sale securities between the end of the first quarter and the beginning of that super-awkward whale-confession conference call. Read more »

Like I mentioned earlier, the David Viniar show this morning is a good time in its (relatively) quiet way. If, like me, you’ve drunk the GS we-understand-risk Kool-Aid, you’ll particularly enjoy Viniar’s take on capital requirements, which is – and I say this as a compliment – pretty cynical. Now, one thing that you might have in your arsenal of thoughts about bank capital is something along the lines of “capital requirements are a way of forcing bank managers to confront the risks of their positions and fund those positions in a loss-absorbing way to protect their creditors and the financial system more broadly.” Your faith in that position should I think be a little shaken by some of the Viniar Q&A. For instance:

Roger A. Freeman – Barclays Capital: [H]ow are you charging the desks for capital at this point? Is it on a Basel I basis or Basel III or some combination?

David A. Viniar: … As far as how we’re charging the desks, that’s a little bit of a complicated question. And we’re working through that now, and it — there’s no one-size-fits-all yet. And we have to be careful. As you know, Basel III does not kick in for quite a while, and quite a bit of what we do is very short dated. And so we don’t want to charge desks on a Basel III basis, have them turn down profitable opportunities that would be long gone from our balance sheet long before Basel III ever kicks in. So we’re really taking into consideration the tenor of what we do and trying to figure out what capital regime we’re going to be under. And it’s still — I would say, we’re going through a transition process here.

On the one hand, totally unsurprising and unobjectionable. On the other hand note the pragmatism: if and when our regulators are going to charge us for capital under the (generally higher) Basel III rules, we will charge desks for capital based on those rules. If not, not. The rules are the rules and the transition to new rules will be made in accordance with the rules. Only. If you thought “well, Basel III will improve the health and safety of banks by steering them away from the riskiest worst scariest products” – guess what, Goldman disagrees. They’ll manage capital to whatever regime is in place, as a matter of complying with regulation, but the capital rules appear to have no effect whatsoever on how they actually think about the risks of their assets, trades and businesses.

Are they wrong? Read more »

Ooh look a chart:

That’s from this quite punchy paper by Patrick Slovik of the economics department at the OECD. It shows you that, in 1992, big banks had risk-weighted assets, which determine how much capital they’re required to have, of over 65% of their total assets, which measures how much lending and investing and trading and financing-their-governments they actually do. In 2008, the ratio was under 35%. What’s special about those dates?

When the first Basel accord was implemented in 1992, risk-weighted assets represented close to 70% of bank total assets, which means that bank regulatory capital was calculated based on a large share of bank total exposures. In the years following the introduction of the Basel accord, the ratio of riskweighted assets to total assets (RWA/TA ratio) gradually decreased and reached about 35% in the immediate pre-crisis period, which means that the regulatory capital of systemically important banks was calculated based on only a small fraction of their total exposures. … [T]he drop in the RWA/TA ratio has been very smooth since the implementation of the Basel accords without any significant deviations from the trend line until the crisis. This trend suggests that innovative engineering of regulatory risks and the move to unconventional business practices by systemically important banks has been a consistent trend for almost two decades and was not limited to a few years preceding the financial crisis. The trend reached its lowest point at the onset of the financial crisis when the capital requirements of systemically important banks were determined based on the historically lowest amounts of risk-weighted assets (relative to total assets). Risk-weighted regulation leads to unintended consequences as it encourages innovation designed to bypass the regulatory regime rather than to serve non-financial enterprises and households. Strengthening capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets may further contribute to these skewed incentives and their profitability.

This is a theory that has been sloshing around the internet for a good long while but this is neatly expressed and – that chart! It is – pretty stark, no?

That chart is worth the price of admission, but Slovik goes on to argue that risk-weighted capital requirements lead to a decline in lending activity: “One of the main reasons why non-loan-related activities have become so important for banks is the relatively high regulatory risk weights on loans relative to other types of assets, which puts them at a comparative disadvantage in the profit-seeking strategies of banks.” The numbers look … not totally unlike the risk-weighted-to-total-assets chart: Read more »