Bank of America

Alternatively, things are looking up for those hoping to romance an Olympic synchronized swimmer. Continue reading »

Last week some guys at Credit Suisse got in a bit of trouble for marking some structured credit assets at fantasy valuations in order to appease their bosses and get better bonuses. I commented that this was a bit different from the run of CDO-fraud cases we’ve seen: the CS guys seemed to think they had a better chance of passing off fake-o valuations on their bosses than they would on the market, and so rather than dumping those assets on unsuspecting clients, they held on to them and hoped/lied.

They might have chosen differently had they met Bobby L. Hayes:

BOBBY L. HAYES, an engineering entrepreneur in Incline Village, Nev., used to trust financial institutions. This is the story of why he no longer does.

Short version of the story is: Because he got stuffed with the equity tranche of a CLO that had bought loans at par when they were really worth 95, making his equity tranche worth zero.*

This is sort of Version 2.0 of the usual synthetic CDO fraud/fraudishness where it’s like Party A wants to bet Thing X will go down, Party B wants to bet that things of Class XYZ will go up, Bank C convinces Party B to go long Thing X because it’s in Class XYZ, Thing X and the rest of Class XYZ go down, and Party B is shocked, shocked, to find GAMBLING against Thing X (really “gambling AGAINST Thing X” which is even dumber) and it’s all sort of woolly-headed. Here, the claim is not that the investors were deceived about who was on the other side of the trade, but about the market value of the underlying securities. That sounds worse. But I’m not so sure it is. Continue reading »

BofA may not yet be done implementing all the ideas Team Project New BAC came up with after “fanning out around the company to ask employees low-and high-level for ideas on [how to] reduce expenses.” Continue reading »

Today is bonus communication day in BofA global markets and while there are no specifics to be had just yet, a couple things to note: 1) it’s not looking good and 2) this hurts them more than it hurts you. Continue reading »

You can’t argue with this:

Last year, the cash portion of bonuses was paid entirely in cash.

Well glad that’s cleared up then! Anyway the actual story is not complete nonsense:

Bank of America told senior bankers this week that the cash portion of investment-bank bonuses, the part that is payable immediately, will be paid 25% in cash and the rest in stock that vests immediately, said a person briefed on the matter. The shift applies to bonuses above $100,000. …

The same bankers also will receive a portion of year-end bonuses in the form of deferred stock, as they did last year. The deferred-stock amounts will vary according to overall pay. A bank spokeswoman declined to comment.

Maybe they’re using “cash” in the trading sense – meaning your “spot” bonus, as opposed to your “derivative” bonus, the one forward-settling in three years?
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Brian Moynihan has suggested everyone gird their loins to soften the kick in the pants they’re about to receive. Continue reading »

All the big banks have reported earnings so let’s take a little stock of things, shall we? A thing I did midyear was look at the ratio of trading net revenues to VaR for GS and MS, to prove that MS was winning the trading or something. Let’s expand that a bit. The result is, I think, an interesting chart:

The interpretation you could put on this is “this is how much money GS/MS/JPM/BAC made on an average trading day for every dollar of capital that they said they had at risk on that day.” Technically, this is is a graph, quarterly from 1Q2006, of [Trading Net Revenue / (Average Daily VaR * Trading Days in Quarter)], for four banks. Go read caveats here.*

This is obviously a toy chart, and too aggregated/undersampled to tell you all you might want to know, but still kind of fun. Continue reading »

  • 17 Jan 2012 at 12:25 PM
  • Banks

Layoffs Watch ’12: Bank of America

The aforementioned cuts continue, today reaching the newest residents of the House of Moynihan: Continue reading »

Cuts are expected to go down at Chez Moynihan tomorrow AM. Continue reading »

While we were out some people who keep to a less rigorous vacation schedule than we do wrote some stuff about complexity in finance. Lisa Pollack at FT Alphaville started the ball rolling by attributing increasing complexity in finance to increasing smartness in the financial industry. This is a delightful theory if you are or were in the financial industry, particularly if you were tasked with developing financial instruments, so we’ll go ahead and endorse it.

Others, however, disagree. Here is a very nice thing at Interfluidity that various financial pundit types found life-changing:

Like so many good con-men, bankers make themselves believed by persuading each and every investor individually that, although someone might lose if stuff happens, it will be someone else. You’re in on the con. If something goes wrong, each and every investor is assured, there will be a bagholder, but it won’t be you. …

If the trail of tears were truly clear, if it were as obvious as it is in textbooks who takes what losses, banking systems would simply fail in their core task of attracting risk-averse investment to deploy in risky projects. Almost everyone who invests in a major bank believes themselves to be investing in a safe enterprise. Even the shareholders who are formally first-in-line for a loss view themselves as considerably protected. The government would never let it happen, right? Banks innovate and interconnect, swap and reinsure, guarantee and hedge, precisely so that it is not clear where losses will fall, so that each and every stakeholder of each and every entity can hold an image in their minds of some guarantor or affiliate or patsy who will take a hit before they do….

This is the business of banking. Opacity is not something that can be reformed away, because it is essential to banks’ economic function of mobilizing the risk-bearing capacity of people who, if fully informed, wouldn’t bear the risk. Societies that lack opaque, faintly fraudulent, financial systems fail to develop and prosper. Insufficient economic risks are taken to sustain growth and development. You can have opacity and an industrial economy, or you can have transparency and herd goats.

This is delightful too, and features goats; my guess is that it’s mostly wrong but I don’t count that against it. One objection to it – though not a decisive one – is that it is wrong about the psychology of the people creating the financial complexity. People who design swaps and reinsurance and guarantees and capital structures actually want to know, really really clearly, what happens when things go bad. Part of the proliferation of complexity – not opacity, complexity – is the desire to have that definition. That’s what a CDO is. It’s slicing the world into possible future states and clearly defining who gets what payouts in those future states. Simple banking is “I will put equity into a bank, you will put a deposit in, I’ll loan out the money and whatever we get back goes first to you then to me.” Complicated banking is “that, but also if we don’t get the money back because of reason X, insurer A pays; and if we don’t get it back because of reason Y, noteholder B pays; etc.” Complexity is a move toward greater definition, greater clarity about where losses will fall, not less.
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Remember, back in ’08, when Angelo Mozilo cried while telling a bunch of Countrywide shareholders that Bank of America, which had just bought the place, would “reap the benefits of what we have sowed“? Obviously that was was Moz-Speak for “you’re about to find out what it’s like to be forcibly sodomized for all eternity,” but at the time, some people wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. Maybe he was leaving some neat stuff behind, like buried treasure or something. We now know that, actually, one of the things that the home lender had been “sowing” for a number of years was the basis of a Department of Justice investigation into the fact that the company made it a policy to dick over Hispanic and black people, one of the many gifts Brian Moynihan has been unwrapping since he took over. Continue reading »