Basel

Unlike mortgage-backed securities, supranational political entities simply cannot have this many sub-prime components and expect to keep its triple-A rating, according to S&P’s flawless debt-rating system. Read more »

It’s become fashionable to make fun of the Basel risk-based capital rules for being overly complicated and subject to gamesmanship. “Why should we risk-weight assets at all?” people ask, for some reason. “Just look at simple leverage and assume that all assets are equally risky!” Sure okay. The problems with treating all risks the same seem too self-evident to be worth discussing (though we have!) but on the other hand I challenge you to read Friday’s Basel Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme report on the “Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book” without feeling a bit of sympathy for the simple-leverage crowd.

Not because the report is complicated, particularly? It’s actually pretty straightforward in concept. Basel II and III allow big banks to use the internal ratings-based approach to credit risk, in which the risk-weighting of a bank’s loans,1 and thus the bank’s capital requirements, are determined by the bank applying its own internal models to determine the credit risk of its borrowers. So to calibrate that system, the Baselisks went out and asked a bunch of banks to give them the probability of default that they assigned to a bunch of sovereign, financial, and corporate borrowers. Lo and behold some banks assigned different probabilities of default to some borrowers than others did and so you get somewhat head-scratching charts like this one: Read more »

If you think bank regulation should be made much simpler it’s probably worth reading today’s Basel Committee document on bank leverage ratios, which the chairman of the Basel Committe described as “a relatively simple measure.” And what could be simpler than regulating leverage ratios?1 It’s just, like:

  • tot up all your assets, including all your creepy off-balance-sheet stuff and evil derivatives and so forth,
  • divide by your equity, and
  • take the reciprocal for some reason.

This is the theory behind proposals like the Brown-Vitter bill, which would do away with risk-based capital measures and focus on simple leverage. No risk-weighting, no monkeying with different kinds of equity, no problem. Just simple, impossible to manipulate, straightforward, easily comparable measures of how levered – and thus how risky – every bank is.

Hahaha no kidding it’s full of weird stuff: Read more »

  • 11 Jan 2012 at 2:07 PM

Vikram Pandit Wants To Crowdsource Bank Risk Management

A thing you might want is for investors to be able to understand the financial situation of the companies they invest in. Traditionally, that is a thing that many people want, anyway.* Much of our system of corporate finance is dedicated to that and it mostly works okay.

A place where it breaks down a bit is in financial institutions. Because big financial institutions more or less take shareholder money, leverage it 10 or 30 times, and invest it all in a large and ever-changing mix of mark-to-market assets, some of which they mark themselves. Then they tell you things like “our assets have a current expected value of around X, with a daily variance of around Y” and since they’re sporting they also give you some sort of rough breakdown of what classes those assets fall into and stuff. This does not give you precise confidence about what those assets are worth today or what they’ll be worth in a week. And you can’t really find out much granular detail about the assets, because disclosing them all would be a competitive problem and/or just take too long / make your eyes glaze over. If you’re lucky maybe the banks disclose in some useful form actionable information about whatever you’re currently worried about, but you’re probably worried about the wrong things anyway.

So you do the best you can, and rely on external sources, like ratings agencies, who might know more than you, maybe, sometimes, or like Warren Buffett. Or you rely on government oversight to keep your financial institutions more or less solvent. But regulators, too, need some sort of heuristic for figuring out what assets are risky and how risky they are. After all, a big part of their job is regulating those risks, by doing things like setting capital requirements. It turns out that this is hard. So they sometimes outsource that job to ratings agencies. That doesn’t always work. Then they get all “we’re going to stop outsourcing risk regulation to ratings agencies.” That doesn’t always work either.

Vikram Pandit has his own idea and it’s pretty neat: Read more »

  • 21 Dec 2011 at 4:27 PM
  • Banks

What We Talk About When We Talk About Bank Capital

Boy, those new Fed regulations, they are long. They have lots of things. Like stress tests, and liquidity buffers, and the thing where you can’t have credit exposure of more than 10% of your regulatory capital to one bank.* But the thing that they mostly have are capital requirements, which are kind of not that surprising, i.e. they seem to be Basel-esque including G-SIFI surcharges, which is terrible if you’re Jamie Dimon, but also wonderful if you’re Jamie Dimon.**

I’ve never really understood bank capital regulation, like, deep in my bones. You can risk-weight it. You not risk-weight it. You can do other things. I don’t know.

One thing you can’t do, though everyone does, including me sometimes, is say that banks have to “hold capital.” Clive Crook in Bloomberg today says a number of interesting things but most importantly he’s today’s person pointing out (emphasis added)

a popular fallacy: the idea that equity sits idle and unused on a bank’s balance sheet as a kind of overhead. In fact, equity is just another source of funds. The proceeds from a sale of equity can be lent out or applied to other purposes just as readily as proceeds from, say, taking a deposit.

That’s, like, important! The first part, the overhead thing, whatever. The second part, that “equity” and “capital” are words you say about funding, not assets, is a thing that you should know. If you don’t know it, go find it out. Crook goes on to say: Read more »

Ooh look a chart:

That’s from this quite punchy paper by Patrick Slovik of the economics department at the OECD. It shows you that, in 1992, big banks had risk-weighted assets, which determine how much capital they’re required to have, of over 65% of their total assets, which measures how much lending and investing and trading and financing-their-governments they actually do. In 2008, the ratio was under 35%. What’s special about those dates?

When the first Basel accord was implemented in 1992, risk-weighted assets represented close to 70% of bank total assets, which means that bank regulatory capital was calculated based on a large share of bank total exposures. In the years following the introduction of the Basel accord, the ratio of riskweighted assets to total assets (RWA/TA ratio) gradually decreased and reached about 35% in the immediate pre-crisis period, which means that the regulatory capital of systemically important banks was calculated based on only a small fraction of their total exposures. … [T]he drop in the RWA/TA ratio has been very smooth since the implementation of the Basel accords without any significant deviations from the trend line until the crisis. This trend suggests that innovative engineering of regulatory risks and the move to unconventional business practices by systemically important banks has been a consistent trend for almost two decades and was not limited to a few years preceding the financial crisis. The trend reached its lowest point at the onset of the financial crisis when the capital requirements of systemically important banks were determined based on the historically lowest amounts of risk-weighted assets (relative to total assets). Risk-weighted regulation leads to unintended consequences as it encourages innovation designed to bypass the regulatory regime rather than to serve non-financial enterprises and households. Strengthening capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets may further contribute to these skewed incentives and their profitability.

This is a theory that has been sloshing around the internet for a good long while but this is neatly expressed and – that chart! It is – pretty stark, no?

That chart is worth the price of admission, but Slovik goes on to argue that risk-weighted capital requirements lead to a decline in lending activity: “One of the main reasons why non-loan-related activities have become so important for banks is the relatively high regulatory risk weights on loans relative to other types of assets, which puts them at a comparative disadvantage in the profit-seeking strategies of banks.” The numbers look … not totally unlike the risk-weighted-to-total-assets chart: Read more »