We all know that no one listens to what credit ratings agencies say, and that if you were buying up all of that RMBS eight years ago marveling at what a great deal you were getting on triple-A rated stuff, you had it coming. But wouldn’t it be neat if you could put the tiniest bit of stock into a credit rating? Wouldn’t it be great if the folks at Fitch and Moody’s and S&P actually had to do the things they get paid to do?
UBS is selling its over-the-counter commodity derivatives portfolio to JPMorgan, prompting John Carney to say this:
Here’s a good rule of thumb. When one bank buys a business from another bank, it’s almost always a case of regulatory arbitrage. It’s never really because of synergies or managerial talent or whatever other hokum the media relations churn out to their willing dupes in the press. It’s just about one bank being better able to take advantage of the rules.
So even though the rationale for JPMorgan Chase buying the over-the-counter commodities derivatives business of UBS remains mysterious, you can safely surmise this is regulatory arbitrage. Most likely, it’s got to do with capital requirements.
Umm maybe? I don’t know, this question seems a little over-determined; the thing is that pretty much everyone thinks that (1) JPMorgan is pretty good at running an investment bank, the occasional hiccup aside, and that (2) UBS is pretty crap at doing so. So are US regulators relatively more comfortable with JPM managing this portfolio than Swiss regulators are with UBS doing so? Sure, probably, but probably so are the respective shareholders, and counterparties, and senior managements, and anyone else you might ask. Really moving any portfolio of anything from UBS to JPMorgan is probably Pareto optimal.
Bank Reform Bitch/ Ethical Fiscal Fairy/ Spandex-Clad Roller Girl/ Better Banking Butterfly Weighs In On DerivativesBy Bess Levin
Her dispatch to DB: “Here I am in front of Senator Schumer’s offices Friday morning to protest his whining to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew to scrap CFTC rules that would regulate cross border derivatives since he (and several other senators claim) the megabanks would get “confused.” (those poor sad banks!) And unfortunately, all that whining worked. Now Gary Gensler bowed to pressure from Lew and European Officials to negotiate a compromise within the rules. All this political maneuvering to save TBTF bank profit is making me sick! What is this frustrated butterfly supposed to do — whose ass do I need to kick — because I’M READY !!!”
If anyone has any ideas, do share. In the meantime: Read more »
Elizabeth Warren introduced a bill today to split nice old-timey banking (taking deposits, making loans to people and corporates) from investment banking and other assorted eeeeevil activities (trading, derivatives, etc.) and it comes with a poster. It also comes with a throwback name, “The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2013,” after the guys who last split commercial and investment banking from 1933 until their Act’s repeal in 1999ish. Some people are calling the new proposal the Warren-McCain bill, because John McCain is a co-sponsor of this/every bill. I will compromise and refer to it as “The Warren-McCain 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 of 2013.”
That’s roughly all I have to say about it? It probably won’t happen, and the goal of keeping depositors safe by limiting depository institutions to boring regular banking is mostly a silly one.1 Mortgages! Mooooooooooooooooortgages! The boring, take-deposits-and-make-real-estate-loans banks in Spain and Ireland and Cyprus and Bedford Falls and 1989 managed to blow themselves up just fine without any help from investment banking.
But you knew all that, gah. This bill is not really about depositor safety in any sort of empirical way. It’s a more ancient and anthropological theory of the dangers posed by banking: there are pure activities and impure activities, and the danger comes from mingling the pure and the impure. You build two buckets and you keep them apart, not because one bucket is riskier than the other but because things just belong in their own buckets: Read more »
I used to work in a business that, among other things, helped clients get financing against securities. One thing that you learn quickly in that business, and then spend the rest of your career trying to forget, is that the simplest way to get financing against securities is to sell them. You’ve got $100 of stock and want to borrow $80 of cash against it? Just sell the stock, now you have $100, you’re welcome.1
This is not a perfect solution, of course, because you presumably owned the stock for a reason, and that reason was presumably that you thought it would go up.2 And if you sell it you lose the chance to participate in that upside. So one thing you could do is (1) sell your stock for $100 today and (2) enter into some sort of transaction that gives you some or all of the upside in the stock over some period of time. Like, you could buy a call option struck at $100, giving you all the upside and none of the downside, though at the cost of having to pay premium for the call option. Or you could enter into a total return swap struck at $100, giving you all of the upside and all of the downside at a zero-ish cost. Or you could enter into a forward contract to buy back the stock, which is the same as the swap, more or less. That last one – sell stock today, enter into a forward to buy it back in the future – is so common that it has a name, and the name is “repo.” Read more »
I can’t find the quote but I recently read someone arguing that you should never worry about anything you see on the news. By definition, the argument goes, horrible things that make the news are newsworthy, and they are newsworthy because they are rare, and so the odds of you dying in a terrorist attack, bridge collapse, Ebola outbreak, or anything else you see on TV are basically nil.
Financial news is endearing because it’s the opposite of that: it consists mostly of pointing at perfectly unexceptional market-standard practices that happen every day and saying “holy fuck, did everyone know about that? That’s messed up.” As Matthew Klein has said, “many things that are considered normal in finance look like fraud to almost everyone else,” so the vein is rich. Libor manipulation, Apple’s taxes, really take your pick. Or today’s Times article “Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial Bills”; my impression is that an article titled “Financial Bill Written Without Drafting Help From Banks’ Lobbyists” would, for sheer unlikeliness, be the financial-regulatory equivalent of a news report about terrorists blowing up a bridge using the Ebola virus.
Closest to my heart among these scandals of differing perceptions might be the “you built me a CDO designed to fail” cases. For starters: the fact that they come out of market-standard practices is reflected in the fact that pretty much every bank has one of them.1
But while every other bank seems to have come out of the CDO scandals with a reaction along the lines of “it’s a fair cop, here is a pile of money,” Goldman, who sort of originated the idea,2 has spent the last few years putting together increasingly convoluted committee structures and online animations to make sure it’ll never happen again, for some “it.” Here is the latest 26-page report on Goldman’s business standards improvement, and here is a genuinely delightful “lifecycle of a transaction” animation that I am tempted to replace with this: Read more »