Hedge Funds

If you’re in a certain line of work, and I bet you are, then your main concern about things like the Volcker Rule and increased capital requirements for banks is that they might reduce your comp. If you’re in that line of work, you’re also probably the sort of person who has a higher than average aversion to having your comp reduced. However, you’re also the sort of person whose comp everyone else would be happy to see reduced, because you make too much already you greedy jackass.

That poses a quandary because nobody’s all that interested in hearing your arguments against the new rules, even if they’re good arguments and not 100% about your own personal remuneration. One thing you could do is get proxies to make your arguments. If you think that the Volcker Rule will reduce liquidity in foreign government bonds, you could suggest to foreign governments that it’s really important that they lobby against the rule on your behalf. You did that. Good work. Let’s see how it turns out. If it turns out well, the next step would be to get other clients to say “well, we want liquidity in our [stocks/bonds/rate swaps/whatevers] too,” since that would then be a more compelling argument.

I think that’s what’s going on in this sort of amazing FT article, but something has gone terribly wrong: Continue reading »

On further inspection Greenlight Capital’s unfortunate relations with Punch Taverns went down more or less as I had thought: they had an un-wall-crossed conversation with management that David Einhorn took to be a sign to sell, and sold without ever agreeing to keep any information confidential. One key and sort of amusing difference – if you believe Greenlight’s explanation – is that, contrary to what I and the FSA thought, the sell signal in Einhorn’s mind wasn’t “Punch is going to raise equity.” It was “the CEO of this company thinks it’s a piece of crap.” Which I guess is also material nonpublic information.

Anyway here is something Einhorn said on his call yesterday:

The Decision Notice … doesn’t seem object to my having sold the stock. The problem is that I didn’t get permission first. “It was a serious error of judgement on Mr Einhorn’s part to make the decision after the Punch Call to sell Greenlight’s shares in Punch without first seeking any compliance or legal advice despite the ready availability of such resources within Greenlight.” It was already obvious to me that I was clear to trade. I have no idea why a compliance officer would have reached a different conclusion. It is highly unlikely that asking would have led to a decision to restrict ourselves.

Here is an alternative view: Continue reading »

Last Friday afternoon, while many a financial services employee was dealing with the fallout of receiving a bonus they did not believe to be commensurate with the work they put in for 2011, Bridgewater was dealing with a far weightier issue. The hedge fund had a thief in its ranks and said thief’s jig was up. Continue reading »

Remember, about a year ago, when hedge fund Level Global was rumored to have a government mole in its ranks? At the time, the firm’s representatives said such reports were total bull shit, and, investors were told, here’s how they knew that to be the case:

“As is the case each time there is a new development in the U.S. Attorney’s investigation, we have conducted an extensive internal factual correlation analysis, cross-referencing the facts in the complaints to our firm’s records. Our experienced outside legal counsel has also conducted its own analysis. Based on all of our work and analysis, we have concluded that these complaints do not appear to be referencing Level or Level personnel.”

Frankly, LG was getting a little tired of having to constantly run factual correlation analysis in order to prove the world wrong but c’est la vie. Anyway, despite usually having a 99.9% accuracy rate, the factual correlation calculator apparently missed one.

Last month, federal prosecutors in Manhattan said in a court filing in the case of a PGR employee that Level Global had made a $1.7 million profit by covering a short position it had in Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. in June 2009. That May and June, a Level Global technology analyst had about seven phone calls with Manosha Karunatilaka, a PGR expert who worked at TSMC and has pleaded guilty to supplying inside information to investment fund clients, prosecutors said. The Level Global technology analyst, Spyridon “Sam” Adondakis, was overseen by Mr. Chiasson and is cooperating with the government’s investigation, the Journal has previously reported, citing people familiar with the situation.

And now this is happening: Continue reading »

“I think there are still very talented traders at banks that could work out very well in the buy side. So, yes, we are looking to grow…If you hire one, it’s like shark teeth. There’s another five behind it.” [Bloomberg TV]

No, not your comp, though probably that too. The Times and the Journal check in today on the state of play in Greece and it’s kind of how you might expect. From the Times:

For months now, Greece has desperately been trying to persuade its private-sector creditors that it is in their interest to exchange their existing Greek bonds for longer-term securities and accept about a 50 percent loss as part of the bargain. The negotiations are known as the private sector involvement, or P.S.I.

A few months ago the deal looked doable, as the large European banks that held must of this debt, estimated to be around €200 billion, recognized that it was probably a better alternative than default, which could cost them everything. Moreover, the banks were sensitive to political pressure from their home countries, where they have a big stake in remaining on good terms with the government and key officials.

But as the talks have dragged on, many of these banks, especially big holders in France and Germany, have sold their holdings. Among the buyers have been hedge funds and other independent investors who are now questioning why they should accept a loss, known as a haircut, if, as it turns out, the deal remains voluntary in nature and Greece keeps paying interest on its debt.

And as the number of such hedge funds holding Greek debt has grown, so has their ability to forestall a restructuring agreement, thus bringing them closer to being able cash in on their high-stakes gambit.

From the Journal:

There are many potential pitfalls, each, in a way, leading to another pitfall-strewn path.

Ha! Also ha! on the Times’s sort of strange description of what the hedge funds are up to, though what they’re up to doesn’t itself sound strange. If I were a hedge fund here is what I would do:

1. Not buy bonds and then later “question why I should accept a loss”;
2. rather, buy bonds because I plan to get a gain;
3. specifically because I’m planning to be all “oh, man, I must have lost that consent solicitation in the mail, could you send it again” and otherwise generally stall on this voluntary offer until my bonds come due and are paid off with bailout money (maybe?);
4. or, alternatively, because I’ve got CDS against those bonds and have no intention whatsoever of voluntarily exchanging them and voiding my protection.

That or “stay the hell away from this situation.” But, like, the above is at least a strategy. Now, if I were a French or German bank here is what I would do: Continue reading »

John Paulson, the billionaire money manager who’s vowed to restore his hedge fund to profitability after the worst year of his career, may have to take a cue from rival Ken Griffin. Paulson’s $28 billion firm, Paulson & Co., will need to generate a 104 percent return to recoup a 51 percent drop in one of his largest funds after wagers on a U.S. recovery went awry. Until he hits that mark, Paulson will have to forgo his 20 percent performance fee, and will collect only his 1.5 percent management fee. It has taken Griffin, the billionaire founder of Citadel LLC, three years to recover most of the 55 percent he lost for investors in 2008. “With Paulson’s assets, size and longer-term investing style, it’s going to be difficult for him to make money back,” said Vidak Radonjic, managing partner at Beryl Consulting Group LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey, which advises clients on investing in hedge funds. “He has large, concentrated stock positions and the market isn’t really rewarding those with holdings like that.” [Bloomberg]

The latest issue of Bloomberg Markets magazine has the answer to that burning question but first, let’s take a gander at who had the best performance, among large hedge funds.

1. Tiger Global, YTD total return: 45% (assets, in billions: 6.0)
2. Renaissance Institutional Equities, 33.1% (7.0)
3. Pure Alpha II, 23.5% (53.0)
4. Discus Managed Futures Program, 20.9% (2.5)
5. Providence MBS, 20.6% (1.3)
6. Oculus, 19.0% (7.0)
7. All Weather 12%, 17.8% (4.4)
7. Dymon Asia Macro, 17.8% (1.6)
10. Citadel, 17.7% (11.0)
11. Coatue Management, 16.9% (4.7)
12. Stratus Multi-Strategy Program, 16.6% (3.7)
13. OxAM Quant Fund, 16.4% (2.0)
14. SPM Core, 15.7% (1.0)
15. Pure Alpha I, 14.9% (11.0)
16. Autonomy Global Macro, 13.9% (2.1)
17. BlackRock Fixed Income Global Alpha, 13.8% (2.4)
18. SPM Structured Serving Holding, 13.5% (1.6)
19. GSA Capital International, 13.0% (1.0)
20. JAT Capital, 12.7% (2.5)

And for those who judge themselves by how many bags of hundos they’ve got to strip naked and roll around in: Continue reading »

We struggle with how bad of a grade to give ourselves for 2011 because in some ways it’s too early to tell. Yes, many of our stocks took beatings during the year, but only time will tell whether we were wrong or just early. We think in most cases the latter, given that we still own meaningful positions in 8 of our 10 (and 15 of our 20) biggest losers on the longside in 2011. If even a handful of these stocks perform like we think they will in the next 1-3 years, we won’t look as dumb as we do today– and thus we might give ourselves a C for 2011. If these stocks don’t recover then we deserve a D. Why not an F? Because an F is reserved for blowing up- and we didn’t…We feel badly about our recent performance and obviously wish we’d done many things differently, but we are not at all discouraged, as we’ve been through this before. If you look at our performance table at the beginning of this letter, you will see that we’ve lost more money, much faster, on two other occasions: we were down 27.4% in eight months from June 2002 – January 2003, and down 32.8% in five months from October 2008 – February 2009. In both of these cases, by playing a strong hand and buying more of our favorite stocks as they plunged, we made back all of the losses (and then some) remarkably quickly: in only nine months in 2002-03 and a mere seven months in 2008-09. We could not be more confident that we will rebound strongly from our latest losses [-24.9 percent for 2011] as well. Continue reading »

  • 09 Jan 2012 at 5:59 PM

Dear Tudor, RenTec Investors

December performance. Continue reading »

  • 09 Jan 2012 at 1:08 PM

Dear Ping Capital Investors

December performance: two very enthusiastic whiteboard markers up. Continue reading »