Tags: corporate governance, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan, Lee Raymond, London Whale
Is Jamie Dimon too powerful at JPMorgan? I have a wonderful, simple test in mind, though it may be impracticable; anyway here it is:
- if a majority of shareholders vote in favor of the nonbinding proposal to strip him of his role as chairman of the board, and
- he remains chairman of the board, then
- he’s probably too powerful!
Let’s find out!
Honestly, who cares who cares who cares who cares if JPMorgan’s board has an independent Chairman or just an independent Presiding Director? The board’s job is to keep an eye on Jamie; if it failed to do that then giving it a fancy new title doesn’t seem likely to improve performance. Is it your impression that Jamie Dimon, who apparently rides roughshod over pissant Presiding Directors,1 will nonetheless be meek and subservient when faced with a Chairman?
Discussion about this proposal is confused because some people think that having an independent chairman is a good thing in all circumstances, or at least say they do; CalPERs’s governance czar, for instance, believes that “There’s a fundamental conflict in combining the roles of chairman and C.E.O.” and so CalPERS will vote to split the roles at JPMorgan just as they did last year. Others think that, y’know, it depends on the people. The people here would presumably remain the same though there’s some rumbling that Dimon would take his toys and go home if he couldn’t be chairman too.
Outside of CalPERS, though, the universal-good-governance theory doesn’t seem to move anyone much. Here, if you’re interested, are JPMorgan’s top 20 shareholders: Read more »
Tags: earnings, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan, research reports
Yesterday JPMorgan research released a 328 page report arguing that global tier 1 investment banks were “un-investable,” and today JPMorgan reported record first-quarter earnings of $1.59 per share versus $1.40 consensus, so I guess it sort of looks like there’s a disconnect. But not really? Here are the analysts on banking regulation:
We believe Tier I IBs are un-investable at the moment and the right time to make a switch into Tier I IBs would be if we get more clarity on regulations providing us comfort around the ROE potential of Tier I IBs or we see IBs having to spin-off their businesses leading to capital return to shareholders. We believe Tier I IBs will continue to remain more exposed to the IB regulatory changes as they try to “defend their turf” while Tier II IBs have the option to step back more aggressively.
Jamie Dimon, meanwhile, responded to analyst questions this morning by more or less begging the analysts themselves to call their congresspeople and defend JPMorgan’s turf, arguing that banks are safer than ever, that JPMorgan’s size and scale and universality provides services that clients want and is good for the world, and that “I hope at one point we declare victory and stop eating our young.”1
The analyst report is a fascinating bit of business. The claim is that global investment banking – by which they mean of course FICC trading – will see market share move toward top-tier banks, driven mainly by the commoditization of the FICC business with clearing and greater price transparency around derivatives, as well as higher capital requirements and more complex and Balkanized regulation around trading activities. The result: Read more »
Tags: Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan, real estate, the doctor will see you now
Jamie Dimon, chairman and chief executive officer of JPMorgan Chase, bought a commercial co-op unit in the base of his Manhattan apartment building for $2.05 million…The sellers of the commercial co-op were listed as Stephen Marks and George Ellis, cardiologists whose practice was located at the address. The unit is one of 11 on the ground floor of the building, located between 93rd and 94th Streets. “They’re professional offices” said Jonathan Miller, president of New York-based appraiser Miller Samuel Inc. “Most of the time it’s a doctor, a psychologist, any type of medical practice. It’s not uncommon for it to be a place to write a book, or just a place to work, or have a private office.” Maintenance is $6,663 a month for the 2,577-square-foot (239-square-meter) unit, which has 12 rooms and two half-baths. [Bloomberg]
Tags: Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan, maybe a call from Tom Brady would help?
Executives and directors of J.P. Morgan Chase are rallying large investors against a nonbinding shareholder proposal to strip Chief Executive James Dimon of his chairmanship, the latest attempt to restore calm following a multibillion-dollar trading loss. The largest U.S. bank is arranging conversations with big fund managers in the coming weeks. J.P. Morgan is scheduling calls and offering meetings with directors for some of its biggest shareholders, including BlackRock Inc. and State Street Global Advisors, a unit of State Street Corp. Other large holders include Vanguard Group Inc., Fidelity Investments and T. Rowe Price Group Inc. Votes on the proposal will be counted at the company’s annual meeting next month in Tampa, Fla. Mr. Dimon has held the chairman and chief executive posts since 2006. Proponents of separating the two also plan extensive shareholder lobbying during coming weeks, including a meeting in Washington, D.C., with funds that hold large blocks of the company. [WSJ]
Tags: AIG, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Dexia, Jed Rakoff, JPMorgan, Maiden Lane
A while back Bear Stearns sold some mortgage-backed securities to a thing called FSAM, which was basically a subsidiary of Franco-Belgian monstrosité Dexia, and FSAM sold the RMBS on to Dexia, and the mortgages were all terrible, and their value dropped, and Dexia sued JPMorgan, currently the proud owner of Bear Stearns, and today JPMorgan won:
JPMorgan Chase & Co has won the dismissal of the vast majority of a lawsuit accusing it of misleading the Belgian-French bank Dexia SA into buying more than $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage debt.
The decision, made public Wednesday by U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in Manhattan, is a victory for the largest U.S. bank, in a case that gained notoriety after emails and other materials were disclosed that suggested the bank and its affiliates knew the debt was toxic, but sold it anyway.
Despite the notoriety this is kind of a boring case: it’s a garden-variety RMBS fraud case; Bear said various things in the offering documents that maybe weren’t so true, and the market crashed and the investors lost a lot of money, and now they’re mad. There’s like a zillion of those cases; actually there’s like a zillion of those cases just against Bear Stearns (here are two).
But the fact that the bank won is pretty interesting? Like, if JPMorgan can win a garden-variety RMBS case then so can anyone? I guess? So I suppose it’s worth spending a minute figuring out what this means for other banks.
We run into immediate problems because it’s hard to know exactly why JPMorgan won; the judge’s order is two pages of “opinion to follow.” But reading JPMorgan’s submissions you can get behind CNBC’s interpretation: Read more »
Tags: accounting, Bruno Iksil, GAAP, JPMorgan, liquidity provisions, London Whale, SEC
Here’s a good Sonic Charmer post about how JPMorgan could have prevented the London Whale loss by imposing a liquidity provision on the Whale’s desk:
Liquidity provision means: ‘the more illiquid the stuff you’re trading, the more rainy-day buffer we’re going to withhold from your P&L’. And since one way a thing becomes illiquid is ‘you’re dominating the market already’, you inevitably make it nonlinear, like a progressive income tax: No (extra) liquidity provision on the first (say) 100mm you own, half a point on the next (say) 400mm, a point on the next 500mm, 2 points on the next 1000mm, etc etc. (specific #s depend on the product). Problem solved. In fact, it’s genuinely weird and dumb if they didn’t have such a thing.
The London Whale’s problem (one of them) was that he traded so much of a particular thing that he basically became the market in it. That means among other things that even if on paper “The Price” of what he owned was X there would have been no way for him to sell the position for X. A liquidity provision is a rough and dirty way of acknowledging this fact.
This suggestion isn’t a matter of GAAP accounting: JPMorgan wouldn’t report its asset values, or its revenues, net of this liquidity provision. It’s just an internal bookkeeping mechanism: his bosses informing the Whale that, for purposes of calculating his P&L and, thus, his comp, they would take the GAAP value of the things he had and subtract a semi-arbitrary number for their own protection.
It is weird and dumb that they didn’t do this although you can sort of guess why: the Whale portfolio started very small, and by the time it got big the Whale was both profitable and a (mostly imaginary) tail risk hedge, so it would have been hard for a risk manager to take a semi-punitive step to rein in his risk-taking. “Just tell the Whale to take less risk” does in hindsight seem like a sensible suggestion, but I suppose if he’d made $6 billion it wouldn’t.
Something else though. Here you can read about an exchange between the SEC and JPMorgan about the Whale newly released yesterday. Read more »