• Now I will sing the background of the merger to you


    Heinz Put A Lot Of Thought Into What Would Happen If Warren Buffett Ran Out Of Money

    Classically, the “Background of the Merger” section of a merger proxy is where you get […]

    / Mar 5, 2013 at 1:55 PM
  • Is he in a basement here?

    M&A, News

    Dell Board Can’t Get Into Specifics, But Just Trust Them When They Say: Sell!

    Dell reported earnings today and they feel a little pointless, as Dell is no longer […]

    / Feb 19, 2013 at 6:52 PM
  • hey that's my name


    Dell Shareholders Will Punch Themselves In The Face To Force Silver Lake To Be Nicer To Them

    One way in which my deep personal laziness manifests itself is my fascination with ways […]

    / Feb 12, 2013 at 2:42 PM
  • Talking in front of my name again


    Dell Board Suggests That Shareholders Not Get Too Attached To Dell

    It’s always a little awkward for a company to issue a statement saying “we’re not […]

    / Feb 11, 2013 at 1:01 PM
  • I also prefer to talk with my last name displayed behind me in giant letters


    Some Dell Shareholders Don’t Know Much About This LBO, But They Know They Don’t Like It

    The Dell deal documents are out and they are short of juicy details; we’ll have […]

    / Feb 6, 2013 at 7:00 PM
  • No no guys this one is different


    Autonomy’s Bankers Were A Little Too Good At Their Jobs

    What do you think of this? Meanwhile, the most controversial banker involved in the HP-Autonomy […]

    / Nov 21, 2012 at 12:04 PM
  • Autonomy founder Mike Lynch. It's basically impossible to pose for a picture in a business story and not, in hindsight, look like you were up to no good. Kweku Adoboli probably did the best job of it but look where that got him.


    HP Thinks That Autonomy Extracted A Bit Too Much Meaning From Its Enterprise Data

    I don’t know much about this Autonomy thing – in brief, Hewlett-Packard acquired British software […]

    / Nov 20, 2012 at 12:28 PM
  • planes-fucking-260x208


    M&A Is Just Too Easy

    A useful though debatable proposition is that much complexity in the financial world is due […]

    / Nov 8, 2012 at 3:16 PM
  • Carl Icahn


    Carl Icahn’s CVR Energy Tactics Are Already Paying Off

    When a company does something that corporate-governance activists really don’t like, like adopting a poison […]

    / Aug 28, 2012 at 4:30 PM
  • Pretend there's some joke here about his hand gesture etc.

    M&A, News

    Come Back Carl Icahn! CVR Energy Still Loves You! Or Something.

    I remain fascinated by this Carl Icahn – CVR Energy situation and wanted to add […]

    / Aug 23, 2012 at 4:11 PM
  • Carl-Icahn-1

    M&A, News

    Why Doesn’t Carl Icahn Want CVR Energy Any More?

    Carl Icahn’s strangely halfhearted takeover of CVR Energy got even stranger and more halfhearted last […]

    / Aug 22, 2012 at 4:08 PM
  • Richard Schulze

    M&A, News

    Best Buy Founder Looking For Graceful, Confusing Exit

    If you were Best Buy founder Richard Schulze, how much would you pay to acquire […]

    / Aug 6, 2012 at 5:53 PM
  • Smiling man in a suit.

    M&A, News

    Merged Utility Companies’ “Common Strategic Vision For The Future” Lasts Five Days

    It can’t be a coincidence that perhaps the greatest 8-K ever filed was filed at […]

    / Jul 6, 2012 at 11:49 AM
  • M&A

    Carl Icahn Is Unimpressed With Goldman’s Efforts To Fight Off Carl Icahn

    And so he’s not paying them on principle, the principle being I suppose “don’t fuck […]

    / Jun 22, 2012 at 3:57 PM
  • You want it to be one way. But it's the other way. See my hands.

    M&A, News

    Goldman Surprised To Find Carl Icahn Being Kind Of A Dick

    Sell-side M&A work is mostly a pretty good and lucrative business model but it has a few flaws. Try to spot a key one here:
    (1) you represent a target;
    (2) you spend your days fighting tooth and nail with the buyer to try to make them pay more and give up optionality, and generally to get more of the benefits of the deal for the target than for the buyer;
    (3) then the buyer acquires the target, fires all the directors and officers, changes the locks, and replaces the stationery;
    (4) then you get paid.

    Did you spot the problem? Carl Icahn did:

    / Jun 21, 2012 at 5:30 PM
  • M&A, News

    You Can Buy That Hot Social Networking Company But You’ll Never Be Able To Capture Its Magic

    One of the more fertile areas of academic finance is explaining why M&A is so […]

    / Jun 18, 2012 at 6:46 PM
  • M&A, News

    CVR Energy Shareholders Surprised To Find Carl Icahn Acting Like A Corporate Raider

    If you want to buy a company you can do it in one of two […]

    / Jun 7, 2012 at 12:51 PM
  • Banks, M&A, News

    Morgan Stanley Will Soon Not Share Its Research Estimates With 14% More Retail Customers

    Morgan Stanley has announced that it will be buying 14% of its Morgan Stanley Smith […]

    / May 31, 2012 at 12:26 PM
  • M&A, News

    Martin Marietta’s Big Mouth Prevents It From Buying Vulcan

    There was a time in my life when I negotiated, I’m going to say, 100 […]

    / May 7, 2012 at 7:32 PM
  • M&A, News

    Spending A Year On An M&A Bidding War Is Apparently Overrated

    There are probably some things that bankers could advise companies to do that are unequivocally […]

    / May 2, 2012 at 4:06 PM
  • News

    Mark Zuckerberg Still A Terrible Banking Analyst, Not Into Precision

    Happy Facebook filed an amended S-1 day! Or something. Anyway Facebook filed an amended S-1, […]

    / Apr 23, 2012 at 5:55 PM
  • M&A, News

    Avon’s New CEO Seems To Actually Want To Work For Her Paycheck

    This thing about new Avon CEO Sheri McCoy is sort of a good corporate-governance-exam question. […]

    / Apr 10, 2012 at 7:42 PM
  • old el paso enchilada sauce

    M&A, News

    One More Thing For Governance Day

    Felix Salmon put up a great note from a reader about investment banking conflicts; it’s fantastic so go read it. But this is a tiny bit unfair:

    You and many other commentators seem to have some misconceptions about what exactly large, sophisticated clients such as El Paso’s board hire investment bankers to do.

    Its always funny how, in the minds of pundits everywhere, those conniving and all-powerful one-percenters who sit on corporate boards become impotent and completely incapable of independent decision-making once an investment banker walks into the room.

    The basic argument is that repeat-player investment bankers provide value not by telling brainless executives whether to accept or reject a merger, but by providing intelligent decisionmakers with access and relationships, and relationships come with conflicts. As he says:

    When sophisticated clients (management teams, company boards, PE funds, etc) hire M&A bankers, they typically hire them for two main reasons (in addition to the legally required shams referred to as “fairness opinions”): Execution and Connections.

    Of those things, connections are higher-value and inextricable from conflicts. If you’re hiring someone to sell you to Company X, a bank who has done work for Company X – heck, who owns 20% of Company X – is the bank you want. And sure maybe their “conflict” will cause them to advise you to sell for a lowball price so that Company X appreciates them more but, hey, nobody’s forcing you to take their advice.

    So, yes, this is all true. But he’s maybe a little too harsh on the commentators and their misconceptions.

    / Mar 7, 2012 at 7:19 PM
  • Old El Paso cars


    Shareholders Seem Unfazed By Evildoing In Kinder Morgan – El Paso Deal

    The shareholder meeting to approve the sale of a public company is always a special occasion, both intense and bittersweet. Shareholders who have loyally stood by the target through its ups and downs over the years want to take some time to say goodbye, but they also know that the debate will be lively and spontaneous and that anything can happen: one passionate orator can sway the crowd for or against the deal. With so much riding on the meeting, space is at a premium; smart shareholders book their flights early, and I would not be surprised if El Paso shareholders camped out outside the Hyatt Regency Houston*, 1200 Louisiana Street, Houston, Texas 77002, far in advance of the shareholder meeting scheduled for 9 a.m. tomorrow. And they will be distraught to learn that the meeting was just moved to Friday.

    No, just kidding, nobody goes to these** and they’re pointless formalities. You can tell because:

    El Paso today said it was adjourning the shareholder vote on its proposed sale to Kinder Morgan until Friday, instead of Tuesday, following a judge’s criticism of the company’s sale negotiations.

    But at the same time, El Paso said as of Friday it has received votes from 70% of the outstanding shares, with 98.5% of those shares voting in favor of the deal. That tally is not official and could change. Shareholders that had already cast their ballots now have until Friday’s deadline to change their votes. A simple majority is all that is needed for the vote to be approved.

    Votes could change until Friday. ARE YOU DYING OF SUSPENSE?

    I guess everyone already knows this but here we are with an internet so it bears repeating:

    Shareholder litigation challenging merger and acquisition (M&A) deals has increased substantially in recent years. To study this increase and characterize the recent litigation, Cornerstone Research and Professor Robert Daines of the Stanford Law School reviewed reports of M&A shareholder litigation in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings related to acquisitions of U.S. public companies valued over $100 million and announced in 2010 or 2011. We found that almost every acquisition of that size elicited multiple lawsuits, which were filed shortly after the deal’s announcement and often settled before the deal’s closing. Only a small fraction of these lawsuits resulted in payments to shareholders; the majority settled for additional disclosures or, less frequently, changes in merger terms, such as deal protection provisions. Interestingly, while requiring additional disclosures is a common outcome, we have not encountered a case in which shareholders rejected the deal after the additional disclosures were provided.

    That’s from this blog post; the slightly longer paper is here. The emphasis is mine and, y’know, look at it: every M&A deal is challenged (actually 96% of deals over $1bn), virtually none (5%) of the challenges result in any improved payment to shareholders, and all the terrible information about conflicts that plaintiffs’ lawyers discover somehow never convinces shareholders to change their votes.

    The one constant is that plaintiffs’ lawyers get paid – an average of $1.2mm in the settlements that Cornerstone and Daines looked at. These suits often focus on incentives of the target’s investment bankers, who are paid only if a deal is completed; I suspect those bankers would love to be in an industry where they could be paid on 100% of assignments while only succeeding at 5% of them.

    The El Paso case is interesting because judge is pretty pissed at the conflicts there and how they were handled, and sort of made known that he was thinking about awarding damages to El Paso shareholders – possibly in the form of judicially raising the deal price by 68 cents or so. (That’s the difference between, roughly, the price that KMI and EP ultimately agreed on and the higher price of $27.55 in cash that KMI had initially offered.)

    That’s pretty rough justice. Your model of merger negotiations could be that you negotiate to the one market-clearing price where, for a penny more, the acquirer would say no, and for a penny less, the target would say no, but that of course isn’t the case. There’s just a range of plausible prices and you sort of hope that the deal shakes out in that range based on negotiating acumen or whatever on either side. You sort of hope – I do, anyway – that it doesn’t shake out based on a judge picking a number out of a hat.

    You see that here. Kinder Morgan of course has every incentive now to testify that the final price – call it $26.87, loosely – was as high as it was willing to go, and that it would have walked if El Paso had pushed for any more. But it’s willing to close the deal even though it seems like, I dunno, a 50/50 chance that a judge will in effect force it to $27.55.

    And El Paso shareholders – well, maybe they were screwed by missing out on the chance to get paid $27.55. But of course if that was the only price they were willing to sell at, they wouldn’t be selling at $26.87. And 98.5% of them seem fine right there.

    El Paso Delays Shareholder Vote, But Early Tally Shows Approval Likely [Deal Journal]
    El Paso Delays Vote on Kinder Morgan Deal (by a Few Days) [DealBook]
    Developments in M&A Shareholder Litigation [Harvard Law School Monstrosity]

    * As it happens I’ve probably spent more time at that hotel than any other in the world, and would be remiss not to recommend the burger at the Shula’s in the lobby..

    ** I actually went to one once and it was exactly what you’d expect: some executives say nice things about each other for 20 minutes, then about half a dozen retirees get up one at a time to be like “I remember when stamps were a nickel.”

    / Mar 5, 2012 at 1:49 PM
  • M&A, News

    Delaware Judge Driven To Possibly Obscene Energy Industry Euphemism By Kinder-El Paso Merger

    Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine has a bright future in blogging if chancelling doesn’t work out for him. Here’s how he describes Kinder Morgan’s negotiations to buy El Paso, specifically KMI CEO Rich Kinder’s price retrade with EP CEO Doug Foshee:

    Kinder said “oops, we made a mistake. We relied on a bullish set of analyst projections in order to make our bid. Our bad. Although we were tough enough to threaten going hostile, we just can’t stand by our bid.”

    Instead of telling Kinder where to put his drilling equipment, Foshee backed down.

    I umm … I’m pretty sure that that quote from Kinder is approximate.

    Anyway, this is from Strine’s opinion refusing to block the KMI-EP merger from proceeding even though he is pretty pissed about some of the apparent conflicts of interest in the deal, including that Goldman Sachs owns almost 20% of KMI while also advising EP, that the lead GS banker owned some KMI stock that he didn’t disclose, and that Foshee negotiated the merger single-handed while also maybe thinking about possibly LBOing EP’s E&P business for his own self.

    Lucrative though my current pseudoprofession is, I suspect that if Strine ever leaves the chancelling racket he’d probably prefer to try his hand at merging and/or acquiring. Certainly he is fond of dispensing tactical advice:

    / Mar 1, 2012 at 6:47 PM
  • M&A, News

    Potential New Way To Create Value For Shareholders: Issue More Press Releases

    I always feel bad bringing you academic papers because inevitably they’ve been on SSRN for, […]

    / Feb 29, 2012 at 4:16 PM
  • M&A, News

    Martin Marietta’s Hostile Bid For Vulcan Came 3 Years Too Early

    Like many of you, probably, I read Barbarians at the Gate at an impressionable age, […]

    / Dec 19, 2011 at 2:08 PM
  • M&A, News

    Maybe Their Offer Wouldn’t Be So Hostile If You’d Called Them Back When You Said You Would, Ever Think Of That?

    You should probably go read Steven Davidoff’s column in DealBook today about yesterday’s hostile bid […]

    / Dec 13, 2011 at 3:16 PM