New York Fed

  • 14 Mar 2014 at 12:50 PM

Fed Looked Into Rategate A While Back

But the central bank must not have looked very hard, as it found nothing untoward enough to warrant any serious attention. Read more »

Snowflake Greenberg is going hungry tonight. Read more »

Someone important, no less! And he’d really like it if the folks in Basel could speed things up and grow some balls, re: OTC derivatives. Read more »

  • 05 Apr 2013 at 1:08 PM

Old-ish Guy To Leave Goldman Board

Stephen Friedman, who preceded Corzine as Goldman CEO and whose tenure as New York Fed chairman was prematurely ended by the somewhat unsettling sight of said New York Fed pouring bailout money into Goldman’s maw as he worked for both, has reached mandatory retirement age. Read more »

A New York Fed underling helped save AIG. Now, he’s going to help it win $10 billion from Bank of America. Read more »

One reason that it’s silly to get worked up about banks gambling with your deposits is that they’re mostly not. Your deposits have a tendency to be structurally senior, insured, at regulated subs, etc.; nothing all that bad will happen to them. Banks are gambling with your money market funds, and with the securities-lending proceeds from your mutual funds. Which are not insured, or particularly regulated, but which fund something like $1.9 trillion of securities dealers’ inventory through tri-party repo, as well as providing some $6 trillionish in other collateralized funding for dealer and hedge fund inventories. And this is really much worse, crisis-wise. Since deposits are insured, runs on them are rare. Runs on repo probably caused the financial crisis. Maybe.

NY Fed President William Dudley gave a pretty good speech about this stuff today; you should read it, or read some summaries here or here. The most fun parts for me had to do with the tri-party repo market.

First of all, if you’re following that market you may be aware that the Fed is moving to get rid of “the unwind,” in which

  • by day, cash investors deposit their cash at JPMorgan and BoNY and JPM/BoNY lend cash to securities dealers, but
  • by night, those cash investors lend the cash directly to the dealers in the freaky unregulated shadow banking market.

Those two activities sort of live on a continuum – traditional(ish) banking by day, shadow banking by night, but still the same provision of credit to the same people based on the same collateral. It’s just that during the day the cash investors’ risk is wrapped in the gentle embrace of the clearing bank; at night the cash investor snuggles up directly with the collateral. Dudley argues that this combined the risks of shadow banking with the complacency of regular banking: Read more »

Have you ever wanted to hold a mock trial of Hank Greenberg’s lawsuit over the AIG bailout from the comfort of your own home? If so, you’re in luck, because yesterday AIG filed with a federal court the complete AIG Mock Trial Deluxe Kit. It’s all here:

  • A written protocol for conducting the mock trial
  • Briefs, reply briefs, and sur-reply briefs from Hank Greenberg’s investment vehicle Starr International, the Treasury, and the New York Fed
  • A polite letter from the Department of Justice declining the invitation to attend1
  • PowerPoint presentations of both sides2
  • A transcript of highly respected lawyers arguing both sides

The mock trial was, of course, conducted by AIG’s board a few weeks ago as part of the board’s consideration of whether to join Greenberg’s lawsuit against the government claiming that AIG’s bailout was an unconstitutional taking of shareholder property. The board, unsurprisingly, went with no, and yesterday it filed the full mock trial kit with the court hearing Greenberg’s claims.

The transcript is a very good read; I will mostly pick out a few amusing points but that shouldn’t detract from the facts that (1) there is a legitimate serious interesting issue here, beyond the “ooh look at the ingrates” surface, and (2) both sides did a good job of arguing it. David Boies, Greenberg’s lawyer, has the harder case – that the government unconstitutionally took 80% of AIG’s equity by entering into a voluntary credit agreement approved by AIG’s board that included a grant of equity – but he does a good job with it, resting his argument largely on Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (which permits the Fed to lend to non-banks but which does not on its face allow the Fed to, for instance, punitively demand lots of equity in excess of what it needs to compensate it for that lending) and on public statements by government officials to the effect of “AIG’s bailout was harsh because we wanted to make an example of them.” Read more »