New York Fed

This and other conclusions were reached by a not-so-top-secret report commissioned by his successor at the New York Fed. Other conclusions: the regulator could stand to start speaking up, having useful ideas, not being afraid of Goldman Sachs. Read more »

  • 14 Mar 2014 at 12:50 PM

Fed Looked Into Rategate A While Back

But the central bank must not have looked very hard, as it found nothing untoward enough to warrant any serious attention. Read more »

Snowflake Greenberg is going hungry tonight. Read more »

One way to characterize US regulators’ new leverage ratio rules is that they require big banks to raise some $80-odd billion of capital, but that’s perhaps more alarmist than necessary. The banks don’t have to raise that money in the sense of going out and selling $80bn of stock or whatever. They make money every year, and all they have to do is hang on to a little of it (and not lose money!). DealBook quotes Goldman bank analyst Richard Ramsden saying “I am surprised by the [meh-to-positive] market reaction. It’s a fairly demanding proposal,” but Ramsden’s note today1 says:

While we estimate up to a $66bn capital shortfall today, this is mitigated by 1) prospects for changes in asset calculations in the final rule, 2) potential asset optimization strategies by the banks if not, and 3) a phase-in period through 2018 (with ~$80bn of aggregate annual net earnings).

Even ignoring the potential rule changes and “asset optimization,” $80bn of annual earnings over 5 years = $400bn, of which $66bn, give or take, or 17%, needs to go to increasing capital. You can pay out the rest. It’s not that demanding. We’re not savages here: nobody’s gonna make you raise equity. It’s just a question of how fast you can return equity to shareholders.

Coincidentally today the New York Fed has a blog post about banks’ share repurchases during the financial crisis. The point here is basically that while, yes, banks were embarrassingly continuing their dividends throughout 2008 while also requiring bailouts, more or less funneling money directly from TARP to shareholders,2 they dramatically reduced their share buybacks starting in late 2007, so at least they were funneling less money to shareholders, so yay: Read more »

  • 05 Apr 2013 at 1:08 PM

Old-ish Guy To Leave Goldman Board

Stephen Friedman, who preceded Corzine as Goldman CEO and whose tenure as New York Fed chairman was prematurely ended by the somewhat unsettling sight of said New York Fed pouring bailout money into Goldman’s maw as he worked for both, has reached mandatory retirement age. Read more »

A New York Fed underling helped save AIG. Now, he’s going to help it win $10 billion from Bank of America. Read more »

One reason that it’s silly to get worked up about banks gambling with your deposits is that they’re mostly not. Your deposits have a tendency to be structurally senior, insured, at regulated subs, etc.; nothing all that bad will happen to them. Banks are gambling with your money market funds, and with the securities-lending proceeds from your mutual funds. Which are not insured, or particularly regulated, but which fund something like $1.9 trillion of securities dealers’ inventory through tri-party repo, as well as providing some $6 trillionish in other collateralized funding for dealer and hedge fund inventories. And this is really much worse, crisis-wise. Since deposits are insured, runs on them are rare. Runs on repo probably caused the financial crisis. Maybe.

NY Fed President William Dudley gave a pretty good speech about this stuff today; you should read it, or read some summaries here or here. The most fun parts for me had to do with the tri-party repo market.

First of all, if you’re following that market you may be aware that the Fed is moving to get rid of “the unwind,” in which

  • by day, cash investors deposit their cash at JPMorgan and BoNY and JPM/BoNY lend cash to securities dealers, but
  • by night, those cash investors lend the cash directly to the dealers in the freaky unregulated shadow banking market.

Those two activities sort of live on a continuum – traditional(ish) banking by day, shadow banking by night, but still the same provision of credit to the same people based on the same collateral. It’s just that during the day the cash investors’ risk is wrapped in the gentle embrace of the clearing bank; at night the cash investor snuggles up directly with the collateral. Dudley argues that this combined the risks of shadow banking with the complacency of regular banking: Read more »