Tags: CIBC, CPPIB, insider-trading, Ontario Securities Commission, Richard Bruce Moore, SEC
To get in trouble for insider trading, the information you trade on has to be “inside” information in some sense. Just standing outside a company’s offices and seeing who walks in, and extrapolating from that, is probably not insider trading. Seeing where corporate jets land is mostly not insider trading, to the point that it was once a feature of Dealbreaker, though in general my advice to you is never to use “well Dealbreaker does it” as a rationale for anything. Certainly there are gray areas.
Here’s a delightful new SEC insider trading case. Richard Bruce Moore, a managing director in the private equity coverage group at CIBC’s investment bank, spent a lot of time with his buddy and client, a managing director and LBO deal manager at the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board. In addition to golf and such, “Moore contacted the CPPIB Managing Director at least once a month about deal opportunities and about the possibility of CIBC providing financing for those deals.” In early 2010 Moore noticed that his buddy was becoming less available, which set his sponsor-coverage-spidey-sense a-tingle, and so he did what any good coverage banker would do:
Sometime in March 2010, Moore asked how the CPPIB Managing Director’s other deals were going. The CPPIB Managing Director told Moore that he was working on something interesting and active. Moore then inquired about the possibility of assisting the CPPIB as an investment banker on the deal.
This got a soft ding – “The CPPIB Managing Director did not disclose the parties to the deal, but responded that, as far as CBIC participation, they would have to wait and see how it went” – and so he followed up a few days later with an email asking if CPPIB needed any debt on that deal. This got a little more information: Read more »
Tags: accounting, Bruno Iksil, GAAP, JPMorgan, liquidity provisions, London Whale, SEC
Here’s a good Sonic Charmer post about how JPMorgan could have prevented the London Whale loss by imposing a liquidity provision on the Whale’s desk:
Liquidity provision means: ‘the more illiquid the stuff you’re trading, the more rainy-day buffer we’re going to withhold from your P&L’. And since one way a thing becomes illiquid is ‘you’re dominating the market already’, you inevitably make it nonlinear, like a progressive income tax: No (extra) liquidity provision on the first (say) 100mm you own, half a point on the next (say) 400mm, a point on the next 500mm, 2 points on the next 1000mm, etc etc. (specific #s depend on the product). Problem solved. In fact, it’s genuinely weird and dumb if they didn’t have such a thing.
The London Whale’s problem (one of them) was that he traded so much of a particular thing that he basically became the market in it. That means among other things that even if on paper “The Price” of what he owned was X there would have been no way for him to sell the position for X. A liquidity provision is a rough and dirty way of acknowledging this fact.
This suggestion isn’t a matter of GAAP accounting: JPMorgan wouldn’t report its asset values, or its revenues, net of this liquidity provision. It’s just an internal bookkeeping mechanism: his bosses informing the Whale that, for purposes of calculating his P&L and, thus, his comp, they would take the GAAP value of the things he had and subtract a semi-arbitrary number for their own protection.
It is weird and dumb that they didn’t do this although you can sort of guess why: the Whale portfolio started very small, and by the time it got big the Whale was both profitable and a (mostly imaginary) tail risk hedge, so it would have been hard for a risk manager to take a semi-punitive step to rein in his risk-taking. “Just tell the Whale to take less risk” does in hindsight seem like a sensible suggestion, but I suppose if he’d made $6 billion it wouldn’t.
Something else though. Here you can read about an exchange between the SEC and JPMorgan about the Whale newly released yesterday. Read more »
Tags: CR Intrinsic, insider-trading, Mathew Martoma, SAC Capital, SEC, Sigma Capital, Steve Cohen
So Mathew Martoma: pretty bad investment for SAC, no? He “was unable to generate … winning trades or outsized returns in 2009 and 2010, and did not receive a bonus in either of those years. In a 2010 email suggesting that Martoma’s employment be terminated, an [SAC] officer stated that Martoma had been a ‘one trick pony with Elan.’” Now we know what the trick was – it was insider trading! – and it looked like a good one in 2008 anyway, making SAC some money on the way up, saving it $276 million by selling out just before Elan announced negative drug trial results, and earning Martoma $9.3 million in what turned out to be his last bonus at SAC.
The trick looks less good today: Read more »
Tags: Donald Phillips, Lewis Ranieri, Ranieri Partners, SEC, Selene, William Stephens
1Q2013 must be I Love The ’80s Quarter at the SEC. Two weeks ago we learned that they were pestering ’80s icon and junk-bond inventor Michael Milken for maybe providing investment advice for money after agreeing not to do that, and today they announced a settlement with “New York-based private equity firm Ranieri Partners, a former senior executive, and an unregistered broker” for letting that unregistered broker solicit investors for Ranieri’s new Selene funds. Ranieri Partners is of course Lew Ranieri, the Liar’s Poker hero, mortgage-backed-security inventor, and general man-about-the-1980s.
The situation, according to the SEC’s orders, is pretty straightforward: former Ranieri senior MD Donald Phillips enlisted his buddy, William Stephens, to fly around the country pitching potential investors on Ranieri’s Selene funds, which were busy buying up non-performing mortgages. Stephens seems to have done a good job, signing up corporate pensions, university endowments, and state retirement systems. He brought in a total of $569 million in capital commitments, for which he was paid fees of $2.4 million.
The problem was that the Selene funds were a massive Ponzi scheme. No, I’m kidding, that’s not the problem at all! Ranieri and Selene were and are on the up-and-up, Selene is still buying non-performing mortgages, and as far as I can tell doing so in 2008-2010 was a good trade and made those investors happy. The problem was actually that Stephens ran into some trouble with the SEC a decade ago over some unrelated kickback allegations, and ended up losing his license to be an investment advisor. And since then “Stephens has not been registered with the Commission in any capacity, including as a broker or dealer.”
But he went and brokered and/or dealt anyway. Read more »