Black Magic Solvency

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Soros puts clean and concise words to what many of us already mutter to ourselves manically while in line at Shake Shack: "...the banking system as a whole is basically insolvent...." How often have we muttered these same words in chant-like monotony, invoked the talisman of the Chapter of Seven and waited for intervention to intervene? Alas, our pleas (and yours) had thusfar been ignored. We tried everything. We even gave that creepy Idol from the Hawaiian burial grounds to Dan Loeb for "good luck," hoping he might trigger a larger financial correction, but even though he wore the damn thing around his neck all day, all he did was have a mild accident during the surfing contest.
Well, no more trafficking in creepy idols and curses for us. The mad Hungarian did the heavy lifting for us:

He added that the system that has allowed the United States to spend more than it earns has to be reformed. "That is coming to an end and it will not be allowed to recur. There will have to be some change."

Way to rain on our picnic, György.
Soros says U.S. banks "basically insolvent" [Reuters]

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